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I. INTRODUCTION
A jurisprudential paradigm functions ideally as a guide to re-
search, policy creation, norm construction, proof presentation, and deci-
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sion-making in specific cases.' More often than not, such a paradigm is
an amalgam which is the product of observation, conceptualization,
and imagination. Of course, no such paradigm is ever free of value per-
meation. Furthermore, such a jurisprudential paradigm is a model
which provides us with a vision of a particular reality. It is my purpose
to explicate, in some detail, two specific jurisprudential paradigms. It is
stressed that both are relevant to the everyday court handling of child
custody disputes. These are models directed at lawyer action, and not
simply at scholarly interaction.
Child custody decision-making focuses on the best interests of the
child.2 The best interests test is a general proposition which articulates
a fundamental value position8 - a preference for the child's well-being.
Best interests analysis can focus on economic well-being, physical
health, family setting, or on a great number of things. But under the
law, the aspirational position of our legal system is that the child's wel-
fare is always paramount. Within the context of marital dissolution or
separation, it is the judge's duty to promote the well-being position of
the child. In this article, we deal with a very critical dimension of the
child's best interests, that is, the child's psychological well-being. Our
goal is to see how the abstract best interest legal standard can be im-
plemented to produce more appropriate outcomes in child custody
cases. It is my contention that better decisions can be produced through
the use of models which give sufficient guidance in concrete cases to
lawyers, judges and expert witnesses. The two decision-making para-
digms discussed in this article have been created to assist those persons
who participate in the process of deciding child custody cases. Addi-
1. The classic example of a comprehensive, imaginatively conceived and most
useful jurisprudential paradigm is the law, science and policy "decision process" fo-
cused "quantum intellectual physics" of Myers S. McDougal and Harold D. Laswell.
See generally, MYERS S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1980) (for the best introduction to their paradigm-in-action); see also FRITSOF
CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE SOCIETY AND THE RISING CULTURE (1982)
(for useful material on the role of paradigms in decision-making); THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed. 1970, 6th Impress. 1975) (for
informative background reading focusing on the role of paradigms in scientific
revolutions).
2. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 719-24 (2nd ed.
1983).
3. The term "value position" refers to one's stand on a preference for a particu-
lar value. Examples of fundamental values critical in decision-making are security,
wealth, respect, enlightenment, well-being, affection and skill. See generally, MYERS S.
McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 15-36 (1960).
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tionally, it is anticipated that a discussion of the two models will be of
value to professors, scholars and law students.
The first model we will examine is known as the beyond the best
interest of the child theory. This paradigm" has been widely dissemi-
nated and has had a very substantial impact on family law decision-
making. Created by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit,8
this model has helped to revolutionize thinking and action regarding
child placement decisions,' and it has sensitized a great number of
judges, practitioners, law professors, mental health providers and lay-
men to the important psychological dimensions of child custody cases.
The other model discussed is the psycho-social developmental best in-
terests model. This model is based on, but is not limited by, the work of
the psychoanalytic humanist, Erik Erikson. Erikson is a very well re-
garded clinician, theorist and social commentator. 7 This model has
been examined in several law journal articles and the model has at-
tracted the attention of a number of persons interested in child custody
issues.8
4. In their widely used casebook, Professors Homer H. Clark and Carol Glowin-
sky call the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit model an influential treatment of the child custody
dispute problem. HOMER H. CLARK & CAROL GLOWINSKY, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 1066 (4th ed. 1990). This particular paradigm was created by
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BE-
YOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973) [Hereinafter BBI (1973)]; JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (2nd ed. (1979)[Here-
inafter BBI (1979)]; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
(1986).
5. Their interdisciplinary effort draws upon the materials of law, psychoanalysis
and psychiatry.
6. Although all do not agree with Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, no one ignores
their views. They surely have forced others to re-think the whole child custody matter.
See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 752-55. Law Professor Louise Graham and Judge
James Keller describe the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit work as seminal and of influence on
the national level. LOUISE GRAHAM & JAMES KELLER, KENTUCKY DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS, 404 (1988). In addition they discuss this author's criticism of the Goldstein/
Freud/Solnit paradigm. Id.
7. See ERIK ERIKSON, THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED (1982) (for an introduction
to the author's thought process). Erikson is certainly Western culture's foremost stu-
dent of human development.
8. See John Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Development-Psychological Ap-
proach To Proof And Decision-Making, 12 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 491 (1976); John
Batt, The Child's Right To A Best Interest Psychological Development Under The
Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Policy Science Reflections On International
Batt
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The first model, articulated by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, pro-
vides guidelines for legal decision-making.9 Yet only an artless exam-
iner could fail to perceive the paradigmatic nature of this jurispruden-
tial effort. It is no exaggeration to say that they have created a truly
influential paradigm. Their work has had an extraordinary impact on
the thinking and action of those who concern themselves with issues of
child placement, such as, the resolution of private child custody dis-
putes. 10 Through their publications and appearances testifying as ex-
Law, Psychological Well-Being and World Peace, 2 HUM. RTS. ANN. 19 (1984).
Over the years, this author has worked at creating a paradigm useful in making
child-custody decisions. This work has received attention from others seriously con-
cerned about how we decide child custody cases. See, e.g., N. Repucci, The Wisdom of
Solomon: Issues in Child Custody Determination, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH
AND THE LAW (N. Repucci, et al., eds. 1984). In this work Dr. Repucci, of the Univer-
sity of Virginia's Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, after discussing the
work of The Colorado Children's Diagnostic Center writes:
The C.C.C.'s philosophical basis for criteria is essentially derived from
Goldstein et.al.'s (1973) proposed criteria. . . . In contrast John Batt...
advocates a procedure that focuses on the child's developmental stage, as-
sessing his or her relevant needs. Then the parents are evaluated in terms
of practical and theoretical considerations - time, devotion, attitudes to-
ward the child as well as intentions, objectives and goals. On the basis of
these criteria, the goal is to determine who will best serve the child's needs
and interests relative to his or her development stage.
Id. at 70-71.
The New Jersey Superior Court, after referring to the work of Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit, states: "another approach is that of John Batt, who approaches child cus-
tody questions 'from a psychologically oriented child development standpoint' . . .
[and] proposes that the court take into account five phases of development of the
human child before making a custody placement." Mayer v. Mayer, 376 A.2d 214,217
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
In the present article, the author has refined and added to the developmental para-
digm referred to in the above works. A large number of circuit judges and Master
Commissioners dealing with custody cases in various parts of the State of Kentucky
have made extensive use of this work.
9. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 31.
10. See Richard E. Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L. Q. 49 (1979-80) (in this work,
Crouch skillfully summarizes representative reactions from lawyers, psychiatrists, pol-
icy scientists, law professors, social workers and judges and gives one a "feel" for the
impact of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's work); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN & ALBERT
SOLNIT, DIVORCE AND YOUR CHILD (1984) (providing a basic description of the
model). The language used by the authors of this publication makes the BBI Model
intelligible to experts and laymen alike. Essentially, the work is a popularization of the
BBI model. See id.
[Vol. 16
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pert witnesses, they have widely circulated their model." Judges, law-
yers, law professors, law students, mental health professionals, social
scientists and concerned laymen have been very affected by their
message. 12
In this article, I shall describe the Goldstein, Freud, Solnit model,
de-code it, analyze it and provide an assessment of it.'" The model will
be referred to as the BBI paradigm. This language derives from the
title of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's best selling book, Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child.'4 In performing the above outlined intellectual
tasks, we will limit ourselves to the evaluation of their model and to its
everyday use in deciding private child custody disputes. 15 Placement
decisions arising out of cases involving physical child abuse, sexual
abuse, physical neglect of children, emotional neglect of children, etc.
occur under institutional, psychological, social and legal conditions that
are different from private child custody disputes.'0 An attempt to assess
the BBI model in relation to these other child placement decisions
11. See, e.g., Pierce v. Yerkovick, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1974);
Faria v. Faria, 456 A.2d 1205 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982); J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON FAMILY LAW 511-23 (1982) (this casebook contains excerpts from a case tried
in the state of Washington consisting mainly of the testimony of Professor Goldstein).
12. In my home city of Lexington, Kentucky, law clerks are urged by a number
of judges and lawyers to attend to the wisdom of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit. A num-
ber of psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and social workers in the community rely
on the wvisdom of these three researchers. Many of the behavioral professionals appear
as expert witnesses in child custody disputes, and other child focused cases, and rely
heavily on the BBI canon. It should be kept in mind that I reside in a relatively isolated
southern metropolitan area with a population of approximately 200,000. We are not
Atlanta, Baltimore, Miami, Nashville or Richmond and surely we are not Chicago, San
Francisco, Boston or New York. Reasoning from our local experiences and the substan-
tial attention given to their work in the legal literature, I am compelled to conclude
that the influence of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit is extremely widespread.
13. My approach is very much influenced by the work of Harvard psychiatrist
Robert Coles. See generally ROBERT COLES, PRIVILEGED ONES: THE WELL-OFF AND
THE RICH IN AMERICA (1977); ROBERT COLES, WALKER PERCY, AN AMERICAN
SEARCH (1978). Equally influential is the existential method of Walker Percy. See,
e.g., WALKER PERCY, LOST IN THE COSMOS (1983); CONVERSATIONS WITH WALKER
PERCY (Lewis A. Lawson & Victor A. Kramer ed. 1985).
14. BBI (1973), supra note 4.
15. Limiting the scope of the paper so as to cover only such cases serves to in-
crease the intensity of focus and permits us to produce a complete critique which will
be of true functional utility.
16. It is my contention that other paradigms must be developed to deal with
these cases. See, e.g., AREEN, supra note 11, at 959-1126.
Batt
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would not produce a clearly focused evaluation of the BBI model.
Analysis of the model within the private child custody dispute situation
will enhance our understanding of this critical model. It is my opinion
that a comprehensive analysis of the BBI paradigm has not been pro-
vided for those persons working in the private child custody field. This
article seeks to overcome that failure of scholarship.
As already stated, two jurisprudential paradigms will be examined
in this paper. The bulk of my effort will be devoted to an assessment of
the BBI paradigm; however, I shall also offer my thoughts on an alter-
native model. 17 Before beginning my assessment of the BBI paradigm,
I add one final introductory comment. In assessing the BBI model, my
first task will be to articulate its major sustaining ideas and elements,
make reference to practical considerations, provide comments on par-
ticular implications and fully elaborate my critique. The reader should
keep in mind that my essential position is that the creation and study of
legal reality directed decision-making models is the first step toward
intelligent decision-making in concrete cases.' 8 Without models of util-
ity to guide us, real world decision-making is devoid of enlightened
intelligence.
II. THE BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS PARADIGM REVEALED
It is important to recognize that the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit model
is firmly rooted in psychoanalysis. This means that their work is deriva-
tive of a psychoanalytic view of existence. 19 Understanding the para-
digm is enhanced if one remembers that Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's
work is the product of the institutional ties established between the
Yale Law School and the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic.20 This re-
lationship began in 1962. Psychoanalysis has been a part of Yale Law
School's interdisciplinary program of legal studies for decades.2
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18. See Richard Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Pros-
pects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J. 969 (1975).
19. See Joseph Goldstein, The Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic and Legal Ed-
ucation, in STUDIES IN CHILD PSYCHOANALYSIS: PURE AND APPLIED: THE SCIENTIFIC
PROCEEDING OF THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF THE HAMPSTEAD CHILD-
THERAPY COURSE AND CLINIC BY MEMBERS OF THE STAFF 15 (1975).
20. Id.
21. See J. KATZ, ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967)(an
early classic demonstrating the high quality of the work produced by the Yale pro-
gram). The more recent publications of the BBI group are evidence of the continued
[Vol. 16
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The first fundamental idea in this model is that the psychological
well-being of the child is a paramount interest which must be promoted
in the child custody decision-making process. 2 Both judicial and legis-
lative decision-makers have failed to understand the fundamental im-
portance of the child's emotional needs." Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's
model of psychoanalytic perspective allows them to comprehend the
importance of the child's psychological needs.
The model establishes that in order to protect the child's psycho-
logical best interests, the law must assure that each child will be a
member of a family. Specifically, the family environment is an essential
zone of privacy which serves as the protective surrounding, making pos-
sible a positive developmental experience.24 Further, the model estab-
lishes that the law must act to maximize the child's opportunity to be
in a family where he or she is wanted, receives affection on a continu-
ing basis, learns how to give affection and is taught to cope with his or
her aggressive impulses.25 The BBI decision-making paradigm places
great emphasis on the child's need for continuity of relationship with
people who act to humanize the child. 6 Disruptions of continuity of
relationships are perceived as being very detrimental to the child's psy-
chological development.27 The damage done by these disruptions of
continuity of relationships vary according to the age of the child. 8 The
younger the child, the more the child is at risk. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit contend that the young child who suffers from some substantial
disrupt:ion of continuity of relationship will grow up to be less than
psychologically normal.29 The authors of the paradigm stress the signif-
icance of disturbances of continuity; even periodic court-ordered visita-
tion is detrimental to continuity of relationship which exists between
child and custodian.3 0 This position is grounded in a particular psycho-
logical reason: "Children have difficulty in relating to, profiting from
and maintaining contact with two psychological parents who are not in
success of the Yale based interdisciplinary effort.
22. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 31-32.
27. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 32-33.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id. at 38.
Batt
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positive contact with each other." 3'
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit concluded that the law must evaluate
the importance of this psychological reality. They believed that the law
should act to insure that a custodian determined visitation, as the cus-
todian saw fit. The visiting parent, according to the creators of the BBI
paradigm, has "little chance to serve as a true object for love, trust and
identification since this role is based on being available on an uninter-
rupted day-to-day basis."'3 2 The day-to-day custodian is the person who
promotes the child's psychological development. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit call the day-to-day facilitator of emotional development the
"psychological parent."3 3 Testifying as an expert witness for the de-
fendant father in a custody case, Professor Goldstein provided us with
an interesting introduction to the BBI paradigm in action." In explain-
ing "psychological parent" to the court, he stated:
By 'psychological parent,' we're talking about a person who has
assumed responsibility and continuity of care on a daily basis. That
doesn't mean on an hour-to-hour or minute-by-minute basis, but it
means someone to whom the child can turn in times of need and
frustration, someone whom the child can find a source of affection
and a source of control.3 5
This concept of "psychological parent" is fundamental to the BBI
system. It is a concept which stresses attachment presence.36 Attach-
ment is viewed as essential to normal psychological development. 37 One
may have the status of biological parent, but if physically absent, one
cannot be a psychological parent. Instead, this person tends to fall into
the logical, psychological, and legal class of stranger.3 8 For Goldstein,
31. Compare id. at 38 (joint or shared court decreed custody is not discussed in
any detail in this work) with Joseph Goldstein, In Whose Interests, in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 47 (Jay Folberg ed. 1984)(joint court decreed custody is dis-
cussed at length in this work). Professor Goldstein's application of the BBI paradigm to
joint legal custody will be discussed fully in a later section of this paper. For now, it is
adequate information to know that Goldstein believes that under certain specific condi-
tions joint custody can be highly disruptive in terms of the continuity of relationship.
32. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 38.
33. Id. at 17.
34. See AREEN, supra note 11, at 511-23.
35. Id. at 514.
36. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 17.
37. Id.
38. Id.
[Vol. 16
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/3
1992]
Freud and Solnit, the relationship between child and "psychological
parent" is paramount, and its integrity should be preserved by law."
Ruptures in the relationship between the "psychological parent" and
the child are viewed as producing failures in emotional development
and resulting psychological symptoms.'" The results of such ruptures
are people who become mentally ill, dependent on society or engage in
criminal conduct. Like the continuity concept, the "psychological par-
ent" concept has been widely accepted by the courts."1
Ellenwood and Ellenwood42 is a representative opinion which ana-
lyzed the "continuity" and "psychological parent" principles. Factu-
ally, Ellenwood is fairly typical: the parties had a stormy marriage,
gave birth to children, associated with paramours, displayed instability,
separated and then sought dissolution.48 The trial judge awarded cus-
tody of the minor daughters to the mother. The husband appealed;
however, the trial judge's decision was affirmed. The appellate court
quotes heavily from Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's Beyond the Best In-
terests.44 It is clear that the appellate court relied primarily on the BBI
paradigm in reaching its decision.
The appellate court placed great importance on the continuity of
relationship of the children with the psychological parent. The court,
with the BBI model substantially influencing the logic of its analysis,
stated:
I. [the trial court] gave substantial weight to the fact that the chil-
dren always have been in the wife's care. Their psychological at-
tachment to her as the only continuous parent figure they have
known is a strong reason for the trial court's decision, and after
balancing the applicable factors, we come to the same conclusion
the trial court did. . . . What registers in [children's] minds are
the day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take care of them
and who, on the strength of these, become the parent figures to
whom they are attached.45
39. This is clearly the ultimate juridical point made by the BBI group.
40. Id. at 18.
41. See Crouch, supra note 10, at 80-103.
42. In re Ellenwood, 532 P.2d 259 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
43. Id. at 260.
44. The appellate court's opinion would be improved by a change in the ratio of
original language of analysis to the language of approved authority.
45. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 262. In many of the cases in which the courts
adhere 'to the BBI approach, decisions appear to be almost decisions by paraphrase or
quotation.
Batt
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Another concept fundamental to the BBI model is the idea that
custody decisions should reflect the child's sense of time."6 This sense of
time depends upon where the child is in the process of psychological
development.' 7
Children, according to Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, do not experi-
ence time as adults experience it. Instead, they experience time in rela-
tionship to "subjective feelings of impatience and frustration."' 8 The
child's sense of time is viewed by the creators of the model as an "inte-
gral part of the continuity concept," even though it is treated sepa-
rately.' 9 However, any ruptures of continuity must be viewed from the
vantage of the child's sense of time. The BBI model makes it clear that
those who work in law must recognize the seriousness of the separation
of a child from a parent, and must see breaks in continuity from the
child's subjective perspective. It is believed that once they achieve this
view, they will realize that the law's delay in deciding cases is not in
the child's best psychological interests.
The child's sense-of-time guidelines would require decision makers
to act with 'all deliberate speed' to maximize each child's opportu-
nity either to restore stability to an existing relationship or to facili-
tate the establishment of new relationships to 'replace' old ones.50
Under this view, the decision process should never extend beyond "the
time that the child-to-be-placed can endure loss and uncertainty."' 1
Court decisions must be made in line with the urgency which is deriva-
tive of the child's subjective sense of time. Thus, whenever there is a
dispute as to who is to be the custodian, placement must be considered
an emergency matter. 2 Decision makers are urged to act quickly so as
to prevent "irreparable psychological injury.""3 Courts, for this reason,
should give child custody cases priority,"' and appellate review should
be greatly accelerated so that the child's interest is promoted.5
46. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 40.
47. Id. at 40-41.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 40.
50. Id. at 41.
51. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 41.
52. Id. at 43.
53. Id.
54. Even the most vigorous critics of the work of the BBI group would agree with
this position.
55. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 45.
[Vol. 16
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Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that the child's sense of time
"guideline" requires that particular action be taken in child custody
disputes derivative of divorce or separation proceedings.5 The custody
question should be decided in a separate proceeding. Custody decisions
must be made as quickly as possible. These decisions should not have to
await the court's decision on divorce, separation, maintenance, property
division or any other matter. The creators of the BBI paradigm vigor-
ously propound the idea that time is a critical element in the making of
final custody decisions. Informed by the findings of classical clinical
psychoanalysis, they argue that not to be sensitive to the time issue is
to act with disregard for the psychological needs of the child.
A third component in what Goldstein, Freud and Solnit have
termed. their "guidelines" 57 for legal decision-making relates to the in-
herent limitations of the law. The authors of the paradigm contend that
the law is functionally unable to supervise interpersonal relationships
and is, in addition, unable to make long-range predictions in regard to
many person to person situations." The law must take these things into
account. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that experience with child
placement cases makes it clear that the law can do little more than
recognize or destructure relationships.59 The law is not able to control
the on-going interaction between child and parent. Moreover, as psy-
choanalytically informed professionals, they have come to the conclu-
sion that the law does not have the "capacity to predict future events
and needs, which would justify or make workable over the long run any
specific conditions it might impose concerning, for example, education,
visitation, health care, or religious up-bringing." 60 However, Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit allow for the making of certain predictions, based on
the elements of their paradigm "[a]s the continuity and child's-sense-
of-time guideline suggest, placement decisions can be based on certain
generally applicable and useful predictions." 1 They state that it is pos-
sible to identify the adult individual involved in the custody dispute
who is the "psychological parent" or who has the capacity to become a
successful psychological parent."' Further, they state that it can be pre-
56. Id. at 47.
57. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 6
(1979).
58. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 49.
59. Id. at 49-50.
60. Id. at 50.
61. Id. at 51.
62. Id.
Batt
11
Batt: Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Bes Interests Paradigm:
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
dicted that the person most suited to the role of the custodian is the one
with whom the child has already had continuing affectionate attach-
ment. This person should be preferred over the person who has not had
such a continuing relationship, even though the other person has equal
or a greater potential for being successful as a "psychological par-
ent."6 The authors also believe that greater damage can be predicted
to the child's psychological well-being when the child is young and the
period of separation is protracted or uncertain." Many future events
and experiences are beyond the reach of the legal and psychoanalytic
"sciences". Moreover, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that no one
can "predict in detail how the unfolding development of the child and
his family will be reflected in the long run in the child's personality and
character formation."65 As a consequence of the preceding limitations,
the law does not act to promote the child's interest when it attempts to
predict the future and sets special conditions for the care of the child.16
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit reason that the imposition of conditions
only leads to uncertainty, and this uncertainty creates a threat of dis-
continuity because the placement decision is subject to modification
due to changing conditions.6 " If one accepts the BBI view, non-custo-
dian visitation and modification based on change of circumstances are
disallowed.6 8 To many scholars, law practitioners and judges, this posi-
tion is astounding. Visitation and modification are traditionally viewed
as vehicles for promoting the child's best interests.
The most important element of the model is a substitute for the
traditional "best interests of the child" test.69 Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit created a replacement for the traditional legal test: an over-arch-
ing standard to be used in the child custody decision-making process.
This standard is "the least detrimental alternative for safeguarding the
child's growth and development test."'70 This standard encompasses
63. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 51.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 52.
67. Id.
68. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 598-
601 (1968) (for a discussion of visitation and modification).
69. See generally, supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also HOMER H.
CLARK, supra note 68, at 584-589 (for additional material relevant to an understand-
ing of the best interests test); MORRIS PLESCOWE, ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 879-932 (2d. ed. 1972).
70. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 53-64.
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continuity, including the "psychological parent" concept, the child's
sense of time, and the "prediction" element. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit explain this standard as
[t]he least detrimental alternative, then, is that specific placement
and procedure for placement which maximizes in accord with the
child's sense of time and on the basis of short-term predictions
given the limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity for being
wanted and for maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship
with at least one adult who is or will become his psychological
parent.71
The architects of this model prefer this standard for several rea-
sons. First, the new standard is more realistic and less "grandiose." 2
Child custody decisions are simply "making do" under a very bad set
of circumstances. The child's "best interests" cannot be served, given
the reality of family break-up. Second, the traditional "best interests"
standard does not emphasize the fact that the children of separation
and dissolution-disrupted families are "victims," and are at psychologi-
cal risk.73 Third, the "best interests" of the child standard has been
overused by courts: often undercutting the child's interests and elevat-
ing those of involved adults.74 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that
the "least detrimental alternative" standard will remind those who
make custody and other placement decisions that all these types of de-
cisions are inherently unsatisfactory. 75 Finally, the "least detrimental
alternative" standard makes everyone face the fact that dispositional
choices in custody cases are limited.7
If the choice, as it may often be in separation and divorce proceed-
ings, is between two psychological parents and if each parent is
equally suitable in terms of the child's most immediate predictable
developmental needs, the least detrimental standard would dictate
a quick, final, and unconditional disposition to either of the com-
peting parents. 77
71. Id. at 53.
72. Id, at 63.
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id.
75. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 63.
76. id.
77. Id.
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Having performed the basic intellectual task of depiction,7 8 we are
ready to involve ourselves in the systematic assessment of the BBI
model. Let us begin in a traditional manner. We shall initiate our as-
sessment by analyzing a particular case. Our specimen for evaluation is
that heartland classic of custody law Painter v. Bannister.7 9 This case
will be viewed first from the BBI perspective and then scrutinized from
a second, alternative, vantage point.80 In examining the Painter case,8
we will focus intensively on the "continuity" and "psychological par-
ent" elements of the BBI paradigm. We approach the paradigm
through the medium of the particular because it is my belief that a
phenomenologically82 significant actual custody case will orient us to
the paradigm "in-action." 8 Such an approach is necessary if we are to
talk meaningfully about the reality of decision-making in child custody
cases. To maximize our intellectual gain, Painter v. Bannister84 will be
treated in some significant depth."
III. PAINTER V. BANNISTER: SPECIMEN FOR ANALYSIS
The Painter case involved a custody dispute between a thirty year
old father, Harold Painter, and the child's maternal grandparents,
78. Depiction (description in requisite detail) - this author believes - is the first
intellectual task of the critic. All too often critical evaluation is marked by a failure to
truly confront the work which is the target of focus. Consequently, much criticism lives
a life unrelated to the reality of the work being criticized. Surely, the work reduced to
its essence is an appropriate beginning point. See generally HOMER H. LASWELL, A
PREVIEW OF POLICY SCIENCE (1971).
79. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
80. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The alternative vantage point will
be that established by the author of this current article.
81. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
82. The focus on the exemplar, the case instance, clears away trance inducing
abstractions. The phenomenon, the case, facilitates movement toward meaningful para-
digms. Of course, the case itself never takes us far enough. Again, my effort draws
upon the work of Walker Percy. See generally ROBERT COLES, WALKER PERCY, AN
AMERICAN SEARCH (1978).
83. It is contended that the validity of the paradigm cannot be tested by tradi-
tional logic, but only by attempted "holistic" application to legal events.
84. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
85. Depth here is provided by immersion in the factual aspects of the case.
Rather than emphasizing legal theory alone, I have drawn material from the trial tran-
script as well as from the appellate opinion. See In Re Painter v. Bannister, No. 24981
Trial Trans. (Dist. Ct. Iowa, Stony County, July 12, 1965) (providing background in-
formation concerning the case at the trial level).
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Margaret and Dwight Bannister, both in their sixties. The child, Mark
Painter, was seven years old at the time of the appellate decision by the
Supreme Court of Iowa. In December of 1962, Mark's mother and his
young sister were killed in a car accident. Harold Painter, severely de-
pressed"6 by the family tragedy, placed Mark with non-relatives. The
arrangement was not successful and Mark went to Iowa to stay with
the maternal grandparents. Harold Painter did not relinquish his pa-
rental rights.87 Moreover, in her will, Mark's mother had named Har-
old as the child's legal guardian. 88 When Mark arrived at the Bannister
home, he seemed to be very affected by his mother's and sister's deaths,
and by the separation from his father.8 9 In November, 1964, Harold
Painter remarried. He contacted the Bannisters and informed them
that he wanted Mark to live with him and his new wife. The Bannisters
refused to return Mark to his father. In June 1965, Harold Painter
brought a habeas corpus action. After a hearing on the custody issue,
the trial judge awarded custody to Harold Painter. From July, 1965
until the time of the Supreme Court of Iowa decision in 1966, Mark
remained in the custody of the Bannisters under a Supreme Court or-
der. This order stayed the execution of the judgment of the trial court
until the appellate court decided the appeal. In 1966, the Iowa Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court.9" The court discusses several soci-
etal factors, including the fact that American family life styles were in
transition.9' It is clear from the court's opinion that the Bannisters and
the Painters have vastly different life-styles. The court profiles the Ban-
nister's home as traditional. Specifically, the court states
86. See generally HAROLD PAINTER, MARK I LOVE You 85 (1969) (for back-
ground information concerning Harold Painter's depression).
87. Painter, apparently under the burden of a depression, derived from the fam-
ily tragedy and apparently realizing that his condition impaired his parenting capacity
did what he perceived to be in his son's best interest.
88. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
89. Id. (the court's description of his problem is consistent with a child's reaction
to such a tragedy). In regard to the matter of depression, see J. BOWLBY, 3 ATTACH-
MENT AND Loss, Loss SADNESS AND DEPRESSION 7-37 (1980).
90. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 152. In 1969, Mark visited his father in California.
His father obtained a custody order in a California court. The grandparents did not
oppose the shift in custody. See generally HOMER H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 745
(1983).
91. In fact, a "new nation" was beginning to emerge. See generally A. TOFFLER,
THE THIRD WAVE (1979) for an analysis of what happened while suggesting where we
might be going.
Batt
15
Batt: Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Bes Interests Paradigm:
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
His [the child's] mother was born, raised and educated in rural
Iowa. Her parents are college graduates. Her father is agricultural
information editor for the Iowa State University Extension Service.
The Bannister home is in the Gilbert community and is well kept,
roomy and comfortable. The Bannisters are highly respected mem-
bers of the community. Mr. Bannister has served on the school
board and regularly teaches a Sunday school class at the Gilbert
Congregational Church. Mark's mother graduated from Grinnell
College. She then went to work for a newspaper in Anchorage,
Alaska where she met Harold Painter.92
Further, the court states that the Bannister home "provides Mark
with a stable, dependable, conventional, middleclass, middlewest back-
ground. . . .[;] It provides a solid foundation and secure
atmosphere."" 3
In discussing Mark's father, the court paints a different picture.94
Mark's father was born in California. His parents were divorced, and
he went into a foster home. Harold Painter viewed the foster parents as
his family. He was not successful academically, and flunked out of
school because of lack of interest. After service in the navy, he obtained
a high school diploma by examination and then attended college for
two and one-half years under the G.I. bill. He left college and took a
job on a newspaper in the state of Washington. Within less than a year,
he went to work for an Alaskan newspaper which employed Jeanne
Bannister, Mark's mother.
The court's description of the father's life clearly illustrated that it
considers it to be a non-traditional life style. Harold Painter is depicted
as one who has a Bohemian approach to life and money. Moreover, he
is a political liberal. 95 He is not interested in traditional employment,
but prefers life as a free lance artistic type. 6 He writes and has pub-
lished, but does not make a great deal of money. He is described as
changing jobs frequently and is a reader of Zen Buddhism." It is
pointed out that at the time of the trial, Mr. Painter was considering a
move to Berkeley, California.98
92. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 153-54.
93. Id. at 154.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 154-55.
96. Id. at 155.
97. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 155.
98. Id.
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The, court admits that the child, Mark, would be allowed more
freedom of thought and action in the Painter home environment. The
court, however, emphasized that although life would be more exciting
and challenging with Harold Painter, it would also be impractical, un-
stable and romantic. 99
The; court also considered expert testimony. It gave great weight to
the testimony of Dr. Glenn Hawks, a child psychologist who testified at
the trial.1"' Dr. Hawks, who did not examine Harold Painter, testified
that Dwight Bannister was the "father figure."101 It is clear from Dr.
Hawks' testimony that he saw Mr. Bannister as the child's "psychologi-
cal parent." 02 Dr. Hawks described Mrs. Bannister as the "mother fig-
ure"108 and a "psychological parent."'10 In his testimony, Dr. Hawks
told the trial court that his concern was with the welfare of the child.
He made it clear that he believed that Mark was at a very critical
development point in his life, but that if he were four or five years
younger, he would not be as much at risk.'05 He further testified that if
custody were not continued with the Bannisters, there was a high
probability that Mark would become anti-social. 06 The doctor hinted
at juvenile delinquency and aggressive acts against others. As an alter-
native, Dr. Hawks suggested that there might be significant "with-
drawal"'0 7 by Mark, such as a schizoid or schizophrenic reaction. 0 8
A careful reading of Dr. Hawks' testimony makes it clear that he
is talking about what Goldstein, Freud and Solnit refer to as "con-
99. Id. at 156.
100. In re Painter v. Bannister, No. 24981 Trial Trans. at 2-43 (Dist. Ct. Iowa,
Stony County, July 12, 1965).
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id. At the trial level, Dr. Hawks testified that the "psychological father of
the child . . . is the most important. . . . Now the father figure is a figure that the
child sees as an authority figure . . . and one who typifies maleness and stands as a
male as far as the child is concerned." (emphasis added); see also supra page 8 (for a
discussion of the "psychological parent").
103. In re Painter, No. 24981 at 30.
104. See supra note 8.
105. In re Painter, No. 24981, at 31.
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id.
108. Schizoid conditions and schizophrenia are serious mental disorders. See gen-
erally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 301.20 at 310 (3rd ed. 1980) (for background reading on
schizoid personality disorders); P. O'BRIEN, THE DISORDERED MIND: WHAT WE KNOW
ABOUT SCHIZOPHRENIA (1978) (for background reading on Schizophrenia).
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tinuity of relationship" with the "psychological parent(s)." Dr. Hawks,
like Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, believed that disruptions in continuity
are very likely to produce extraordinarily, undesirable psychological
outcomes, either severe mental disorder or criminal and anti-social con-
duct. It is beyond question that the Iowa Supreme Court reacted favor-
ably to the ideas and conclusions put forth by Dr. Hawks. 10 9 The court
viewed continuity of relationship between Mark and the Bannisters as
being in the seven year old boy's best interests.
The Iowa Supreme Court, reversing the trial judge, took the posi-
tion that Mark and Mr. Bannister had a relationship which Mark had
not had with his natural father. This relationship was an important
psychological one. The court stated that it was in Mark's best interest
to be in the stable situation provided by the Bannister home. The court
concluded that Mark should not be shifted to his father "in the face of
the dire warnings from an eminent child psychologist. .. .
Goldstein approves of the decision in Painter v. Bannister."' He
characterizes the case as one in which a court was asked to disrupt a
"satisfactory on-going 'parent-figure' 
- child relationship and make an
abrupt change without any plan for transition to allow for the gradual
re-establishment of a relationship between natural father and son. '"112
In his article, he outlines the court's adjective-oriented comparison of
the contending parties; 1 but, he offers no critique of this comparison.
Goldstein applauds the court for its decision to avoid making judg-
ments based on the choice of competing life styles. He asserts that the
choice in this case was between parties who were all fit custodians.
Goldstein indicates that the court's unwillingness to simply support the
preference in law for the biological parent was proper. Finally, he
states "[e]valuated in the light of Anna Freud's need-for-continuity
formulation, the decision can be understood as a determination made in
accord with the overall mandate of the state - the child's best
interests."""
A careful reading of Goldstein's article makes it clear that he sup-
ports the Iowa Supreme Court's decision because it stresses the impor-
tance of the "continuity of relationship" and "psychological parent"
109. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
110. Id.
111. 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
112. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 475-76.
113. Id. at 476.
114. Id.
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concepts.'" 8 The language in his article relating to a planned transition
so that custody could be transferred to the father is of no relevance to
the Painter case."16 The basic question for decision in Painter", was
which of the contending parties was entitled to here-and-now "full" le-
gal custody. Goldstein's opinion would be that the court made the right
decision in protecting the child's continuity.
At the time of the appellate court decision, Mark was seven years
old and functioning well. He was at a psychological state of develop-
ment which is termed "latency."' 8 Latency is generally viewed as "ex-
isting" between approximately ages six and thirteen. 1 9 According to
psychoanalysts, by the time the child reaches the latency phase of psy-
chological development, the executive psychological apparatus, the
ego, 120 is well-evolved and the aggressive and affectional - erotic urges
(instincts)' are controlled by the child. By the latency phase of psy-
chological development, the child has achieved substantial psychologi-
cal maturity.
As Anna Freud, one of the creators of the BBI placement para-
digm writes:
In the course of a few years the situation alters. The latency period
sets in, with a physiologically conditioned decline in the strength of
the instincts and a truce is called in the defensive warfare waged
by the ego. It now has leisure to devote itself to other tasks and it
acquires fresh contents, knowledge and capacities. At the same
time it becomes stronger in relation to the outside world; it is less
helpless and submissive and does not regard the world as quite so
omnipotent as heretofore. Its whole attitude to external objects
[people] gradually changes as it surmounts the Oedipus situation.
Complete dependence on the parents cease ... .
115. Id.
116. Id. at 475-76.
117. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 153.
118. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 86 (2d. ed. 1963).
119. A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 292 (Rev. ed. 1978).
120. The ego is in actuality a brain system network (neurochemical, etc.) which
acts to balance the interests of the desiring self, one's moral conscience and social real-
ity. See JEAN LAPLANCHE & JEAN-BERTRAND PONTALIS, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 130-43 (1973) for a condensed discussion of the ego and its operation.
121. Id. at 214-16. Those who prefer an orthodox psychoanalytic approach view
instincts as pressures which create tensions. Normally it is stated that human beings
seek to reduce these tensions via interactions with other persons.
122. ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 157 (1946); see
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Ms. Freud makes the following points in her statement: first, by
the latency phase, the child's psychological life has settled down to a
very significant extent; second, the executive apparatus of the psyche,
the ego, has things relatively well in hand; third, a state of stability has
been achieved; fourth, the child is ready for an extensive real world
education; and fifth, the parents are no longer as psychologically as
important as they were in the past. The well-established fact is that the
latency child, called middle years child by some, "characteristically
turns his attention away from family involvements and outward to the
world at large."'23 Our culture, though its system of education, pro-
motes this development."2 4
Mark, at age seven, is capable of significant self control. In addi-
tion, he has attained substantial cognitive capacity. He has become
more naturalistic, more objective, has developed the ability to classify,
and is becoming versed in the use of numbers. Further, he is acquiring
a fund of general knowledge and is learning to think and reason in a
manner similar to adults. In addition, the psychologically normal child
is capable of making age appropriate moral judgments. All in all, the
child is quite different from the being he or she was three or four years
earlier.' 25 A latency stage child is, in sum, a competent human being.
For these reasons, it was improper for the Court to fail to return
Mark to the custody of his father. This return would not have put
Mark at risk. At age seven and functioning well within the normal
range, Mark cannot be seen as extremely vulnerable. Furthermore,
Harold Painter was examined by a psychiatrist and was found to be
psychiatrically fit.' There was no evidence which indicated that Har-
old Painter was legally unfit in any way. The normal seven year old is
psychologically capable of handling the shift from the grandparents to
the father. His adaptive capacity is significant. 27 This does not mean
that there will not be problems; however, problems can be solved.
also ANNA FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR TEACHERS AND PARENTS (Beacon Press ed.
7th prtg 1971).
123. L. JOSEPH STONE & JOSEPH CHURCH, CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 388
(3d ed. 1973).
124. In a complex modern society, this is a matter of necessity. The family sim-
ply cannot prepare one for life in the broader environment of modern existence. Educa-
tional specialists must perform the task of preparation.
125. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 123, at 388-400.
126. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 154-55.
127. See generally D. GESENSWAY, PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS
84 (1982).
[Vol. 16
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/3
19921
Goldstein and those who adhere to the BBI paradigm are overly
apprehensive. For them, the custody conflict is an event which is a
jeopardy situation of the highest order. This position cannot be sup-
ported; and in fact, there exists significant findings which cast doubt on
it. For example, the Berkeley, California study conducted by Joan
MacFarlane and her associates1"8 contains findings which support this
position. The study covers a period of thirty years; thus, it is a long
range study with findings that are directly relevant to our discussion.
The study illustrates that .those who place a great emphasis on the
link between trauma in childhood and resulting psychopathology in
later years may well be in error. Arlene Skolnick, reporting on the
Berkeley study, wrote:
Foremost, the researchers tended to over-estimate the damaging ef-
fects of early troubles of various kinds. Most personality theory has
been derived from observations of troubled people in therapy. The
pathology of adult neurotics and psychotics was traced back to dis-
turbances in childhood-poor parent-child relations, chronic school
difficulties, and so forth. Consequently, theories of personality
based on clinical observation tended to define adult psychological
problems as socialization failures. But the psychiatrist sees only
disturbed people, he does not encounter 'normal' individuals who
may experience childhood difficulties, but who do not grow into
troubled adults. The Berkeley method, however, called for studying
such people. Data on the experience of these subjects demonstrated
the error of assuming that similar childhood conditions affect every
child the same way. 129
All of this applies to many psychoanalytic clinicians, psychoana-
lytic researchers, and makers of psychoanalytic jurisprudence. 130 One
must keep in mind that psychoanalytic theory derives from very special
clinical circumstances. Sigmund Freud worked almost exclusively with
adults - including himself as analysand. 31 He built his theory by recon-
128. JOAN MACFARLANE, ET AL., A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF THE BEHAVIOR
PROBLEMS OF NORMAL CHILDREN BETWEEN TWENTY-ONE MONTHS AND FOURTEEN
YEARS (1954).
129. ARLENE SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT, EXPLORING MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY 379 (1973).
130. E.g., J. KATZ, ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967) (an
interesting work of this sort which is an important early contribution to psychoanalytic
jurisprudence).
131. Freud's self-analysis was certainly essential to the building of his theoretical
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structing the psychological lines of those who sought treatment. Anna
Freud, one of the creators of the BBI model, spent much of her career
working within the model constructed by her father.1"2 She is the first
lady of orthodox psychoanalysis, and the BBI paradigm is definitely
rooted in orthodox psychoanalysis. Orthodox psychoanalysis, because
its theory is primarily a product of the historical reconstruction of the
lives of the psychological dysfunctional and because it over-predicts
psychological dysfunction, does not produce a model which has the ap-
propriate level of judicial decision-making reliability. Other workers in
psychology, especially non-orthodox psychoanalysts, have suggested
more appropriate models for use in the legal system. The theory, the
clinical practice, and the isolation of orthodox psychoanalysis from the
current of social, historical, political, economic and cultural aspects of
existence all combine to lead orthodox psychoanalytic observers and
practitioners to overreact when confronted with the phenomenon of the
child custody dispute.133
However, for those who are less focused on clinical psychoanalysis
and classical, orthodox, psychoanalytic theory, things are viewed differ-
ently. 1 4 Not every child of divorce or of a custody dispute is a victim
proximate to his or her psychic undoing. Life is as it is. Existential
realities are within the coping capacity of many, children and adults. 38
Divorce has become commonplace in our society. Parents are often sep-
arated from their children; they fall ill, they die, they go off to serve in
the military, they hire surrogate caretakers, or they go through signifi-
cant personal changes. Children lose their friends, they leave behind
their favorite teacher, they move to a new community. 36 Loss is a ba-
sic experience in life - things do not stay the same. How a child fares,
psychologically, ethically, and morally, depends to a very significant ex-
and clinical edifice. See PAUL ROAZEN, FREUD AND His FOLLOWERS 82-88 (1975).
132. Id. at 436-60.
133. See generally M. EAGLE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
(1984) (for alternatives to orthodox psychoanalysis).
134. See e.g., Jerome Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child
Development and Social Context, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 38 (1975) (for an out-
standing article on this point).
135. See e.g., KURT VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE (1968);
WILLARD GAYLIN, FEELINGS: OUR VITAL SIGNS (1979); KARL MENNINGER ET AL.,
THE VITAL BALANCE (1963).
136. This is the reality of existence. See HERMAN HESSE, SIDDARTHA (New Di-
rections ed. 1957) (perhaps the best text on the "true" conditions of existence).
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tent on what happens to the child after the loss or trauma.'37 For ex-
ample, some children may lose someone who was a satisfactory custo-
dian, but gain another who is even more life-enhancing. Other children
may lose a parent who was, in fact, a negative force - that child is
liberated by the separation. The life outcome depends on the people one
meets and attaches to outside of the family. The shape of our life de-
pends upon the vicissitudes of social history. Children need psychologi-
cal attachment; however, not every disruption of continuity of relation-
ship is going to cause serious long term damage to a child. Children are
resilient. 8 Judges and lawyers must understand this reality.
The Painter case' 39 did not involve an adoption. Further, the case
is not a termination of parental rights case; Mark's father was never
charged with parental neglect. Harold Painter was the biological father
of Mark. Mark did not begin living with the Bannisters until he was
five years old.' 4 ' The bulk of Mark's first five years of life were spent
with his father, Harold Painter. Consequently, Harold was not a psy-
chological stranger to his son. Thus, it is clear that, during Mark's
early formative years, Harold was a "psychological parent" and his in-
teractions with Mark were very important in building Mark's personal-
ity and intellectual capacity. It is well known that psychological struc-
ture and intellectual, or cognitive, development in these formative years
is very dependent on mimetic operations within the context of the
child-parent interaction.'' The child learns by imitating the parents.
Finally, psychological attachment, in these especially formative years,
is the foundation of developmental progress. 4" The Iowa Supreme
Court overlooked this reality of this basic process and its significance in
its decision. The Court accepted the fact that Mark was psychologi-
cally healthy and intelligent. 4 8 Dr. Hawks had testified to this fact.44
137. See generally H. DERossis & V. PELLOGRINO, THE BOOK OF HOPE (1976)
(for an interesting work on this matter).
138. Lloyd DeMause, The Evolution Childhood, I HIST. OF CHILDHOOD Q: THE
J. PSYCHOHISTORY 503-75 (1974).
139. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
140. Id. at 156.
141. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 123, at 72-73; see also S. FRAIBERG,
THE MAGIC YEARS (1959).
142. See JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1969); see also JOHN
BOWLBY, THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF AFFECTIONAL BONDS (1979).
143. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
144. In Re Painter, No. 24981, at 17-18 (trial transcript containing the testi-
mony of Dr. Hawks).
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Since the Iowa Supreme Court portrayed Harold Painter as a fit fa-
ther, it is reasonable to infer that he had been involved with his son and
had played an important role in the child's early psychological and cog-
nitive development. 45
Despite the fact that Harold Painter had been physically out of
Mark's life as a parent, during Harold's life crisis time-out, he was still
Mark's "psychological parent" and was therefore psychically engraved
in Mark's mind. Psychological parents are encoded in a child's brain
system." A "psychological parent" exists within the mind and influ-
ences thought, emotion and behavior. Furthermore, Freud's work on
the parent-derived super-ego makes this abundantly clear.'47 Moral
conscience is derived from interaction with the parents. The BBI theory
does not instruct child custody decision makers on this most important
psychological fact. Even Professor Goldstein fails to discuss this psychic
reality when he comments on the decision in the Painter case.
The psychological situation in the Painter case was that between
the ages of five and seven, Mark's image of Harold, a "psychological
parent," was not expunged. Memories, emotions, images, ideas and
fantasies relating to his father continued to exist in Mark's mind. In a
psychological and brain-content sense, his father lived within him. This
basic fact makes the Painter case quite different from one involving
adoption by a stranger or custody to a third party who has not been in
psychological attachment to the child. The Iowa Supreme Court failed
to see these differences. Harold Painter was not without attachments to
his son. A very strong attachment between Mark and Harold already
existed. Harold Painter had been a "psychological parent" in Mark's
critical first five years of development. This intense psychological at-
tachment still existed in the minds of Mark and Harold. Because of
Mark's internalized image of Harold as his "psychological parent," a
shift in custody from the Bannisters to Harold Painter did not present
145. The designation of a parent's fitness is a result of the court's evaluation of
the "relevant factors" which, of course, relate to the individual's capacity to parent.
"Relevant factors" would include mental health, physical health, moral character, in-
telligence, economic position, etc.
146. The most accessible material on this reality can be found in the following
works: see ERIC BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY 23-28 (1964); JONATHAN WINSON,
BRAIN AND PSYCHE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1985) (a much more com-
plex, but very enlightening discussion of the relationship between/among life experi-
ence, brain function and psychic contents).
147. See 21 STANDARD EDITION OF COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 62 (James Strachey ed. 1964).
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the at-risk situation the Iowa Supreme Court and Professor Goldstein
found to exist. The psychological relationship was a pre-existing infra-
structure which could "smooth" the transition of custody from the Ban-
nister's to Harold. Certainly, there would be a period of adjustment;
however, given the existence of the earlier attachment, the opportunity
for a successful change of custody would be much enhanced.
Due to the existence of an antecedent attachment, and the fact
that Mark was of school age and relatively resilient, it can be con-
cluded that Professor Goldstein's support for the Painter decision is
open to criticism. 4 8 Professor Goldstein placed too much emphasis on
the utility of the pure continuity approach. Specifically, a psychosocial
"best interest" approach to the Painter case should be preferred to the
orthodox psychoanalytic approach."" The term "psychosocial" is used
to emphasize the relationship between the psychological structure of
the individual and his or her surrounding social world. The crux of this
approach is to examine how the individual exists within the social eco-
sphere of his historical time.
It is inherent in the positions of the Iowa Supreme Court and Pro-
fessor Goldstein that Mark Painter needed continuity of relationship
with his maternal grandparents. This emphasis on continuity does not
do justice to the human complexity which is the true context of the
custody decision. To determine the best interests position of the child in
the Painter case, and in many other cases, the limited approach re-
quired by a guideline as basic as the continuity concept must be es-
chewed. The child's needs must be analyzed by looking to the totality
of relevant psychosocial circumstances. This approach requires the de-
cision-makers to scrutinize the child's best interests situation by deter-
mining where the child stands developmentally, assessing what her or
his needs are in relationship to developmental status, and determining
who out of those seeking custody has the capacity to best promote the
child's interests. In the simplest terms, the court must determine who is
most fit.
Erikson's model contains eight life stages.10  Three of the stages
relate to adulthood and are not relevant to child custody disputes. The
five stages relevant to the child custody matters are:'5 1
148. See MAcFARLANE et al., supra note 128; DEMAUSE, supra note 138.
149. On this matter of psychosocial emphasis I am greatly influenced by the
work of Erik Erikson. See supra, note 7.
150. See ERIKSON, supra note 118.
151. Id.
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(1) Stage I - (approximately the first year of life). During this
developmental phase, the child has the opportunity to achieve a positive
life view called basic trust. Basic trust develops when the child is well
cared for, psychologically and phyfically, by an adult or adults of at-
tachment. An appropriate experience in attachment during this stage of
development prepares one for human intimacy and social interaction in
later stages.
(2) Stage II - (about the second and third year of life). The child
seeks to develop personal autonomy and begins to explore the home
environment.
(3) Stage III - (about age four and five). The child starts to take a
serious interest in life outside of the home. The child is learning
through play. Attachments to people outside of the home are made.
(4) Stage IV - (approximately the sixth through the eleventh
year). The child becomes immersed in the outside culture. The acquisi-
tion of culturally approved skills and knowledge is the major task of
this stage. This is the stage of essential learning.
(5) Stage V - (about the twelfth through eighteenth year). The
child is in the process of consolidating the emerging self. Cultural and
gender identities are worked out.
Evaluating the Erikson model in light of the Painter case, it is
clear that Mark was in Stage IV at the time of the trial and appellate
decisions. He was seven years of age. Mark had already become ac-
tively involved outside of the home. Trial testimony illustrated that he
was relating to children and adults outside of the family setting.152
During this phase of active learning, the child is interested in imitating
the behavior of adults in the outside world. The male child becomes
interested in the social role activities of firemen, truck drivers, musi-
cians, athletes, sales people, policemen and other grown-ups engaged in
vocation and avocation. 153 Further, school is a focal point of the child
during this stage of psychosocial development, and learning from the
electronic media is also an important experience. The school experience
is instrumental in the development of a child. Culture makes itself
known to the child in the form of the school and its teachers. The
teacher, the transmitters of the cognitive technology and the values of
culture, inhabits the school environment and passes on the culture fund
to the child. Moreover, the child is surrounded by a large number of
peers who come from "other" homes - homes with norms, values and
152. In Re Painter, No. 24981, at 17.
153. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY YOUTH AND CRISIS 112 (1968).
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ways of doing things that differ from those of her or his own parents. In
addition, older students will also influence the child. At this stage of
psychosocial development, the child will go through the process of ad-
justing to a great variety of personality types and will experience a
diversity of folkways. Very significant cognitive, social, aesthetic and
moral - ethical development is occurring during this developmental
stage.
At school, the child is being prepared to function in a complex
society which holds organization to be an important value. Our educa-
tional institutions make the child aware of the fact that our culture
requires that people learn to structure time. In addition, the child dis-
covers that the formal curriculum is structured. Planning, as a socially
approved behavior, is also modeled by the teachers. The school places
great emphasis on culturally valued work and citizenship values. The
child has left the world of play behind, and is learning fundamentals
which will prepare the child to take his or her place in the material
economy. There is an emphasis on productivity. The child is learning to
work cognitively on his or her own and to work socially with other peo-
ple. The child has moved from the "womb" of the family into the sur-
rounds of school and the larger world.
Through the school experience, the child learns to take pride in
culturally approved production. This ability to be productive is impor-
tant in helping the child ward off feelings of incapacity and inade-
quacy. Doing becomes an important part of being. 54 If things go well,
the child begins to feel that he or she can succeed in the world outside
of the family. This experience is critical to the process of becoming
fully "grown-up." However, not all learning goes on in school: it occurs
on the playground after school, in the neighborhood, on trips around
town, city, county, region, country and the world. Children learn out of
school from peers, older children, adults and electronic media. This
learning: is cognitive, affective and social.
The child is also going through a phase of moral/ethical evolu-
tion. 155 The swirl of life outside of the home provides standards, models
and examples which impact heavily on the moral/ethical development
of the child. The ethical and moral standards of the child's particular
154. Id. at 87-93. The author acknowledges the possibility that all school, includ-
ing homework, and no play may endanger the child. A programmed compulsive work
ethic will not benefit the child. A sense of proportion is critical in promoting healthy
development.
155. See ROBERT COLEs, THE MORAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (1986).
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family are compared to those available in the environs of the non-fa-
milial world. Freedom, equality, justice, injustice, law, order, authority,
power, prestige, privilege, oppression, license, loyalty, treachery, and
pride are matters on the existential agenda of the learning stage child.
During this stage of psychosocial development, the child is moving
along cognitive, social, moral and ethical lines of development. How-
ever, another critical line of development is called the affectional and
erotic line of development. This line of development is essential to the
acquisition of psychological health. Professor Goldstein, the BBI group,
and the Iowa Supreme Court have failed to appropriately treat the fun-
damental aspects of the child's learning stage. They have also failed to
emphasize the best interests importance of the affectional and erotic
development stage in the "latency" child (Stage IV). Professor Gold-
stein makes this mistake because of his preference for orthodox psycho-
analysis. This preference causes him to ignore the affectional and erotic
development in the child's latency age. L. Joseph Stone and Joseph
Church agree with this theory:
Freud's original notion of latency as an asexual time out has had to
be modified in the light of what we now know about sexuality in
the middle years (Stage IV). Sexual interest and play are not snuf-
fed out. . . . It is worth noting that whereas Freud had to combat
the popular belief that there was no infantile sexuality to become
latent, the post-Freudians have to combat Freud's idea that there is
a gap in the chain of overt psychosexual development.1 56
Prior to the 1960's, when the Painter case was decided, 1 5 the la-
tency theory of psychosexuality had been greatly criticized. Stage IV
children are very interested in sexuality and these children form affec-
tional and erotic attachments. Affectional and erotic issues do not sim-
ply appear out of the blue in adolescence. A failure to focus attention
on this line of development makes a best interests analysis incomplete.
An appropriate custodian can deal affectively with affectional and
erotic matters, and Judges must be aware of this reality.
In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court made reference to the topic
of college education. The Bannisters were described as "college gradu-
ates". 158 Jeanne Painter, Mark's mother, was described as a graduate
of Grinnell College, and Jeanne's three sisters received college educa-
156. STONE & CHURCH, supra note 123, at 381.
157. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
158. Id.
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tions and married college men. The Court stated that "if placed in the
custody of the Bannisters, Mark would have an opportunity for a col-
lege education and a profession ...."159 On the other hand, Harold
Painter was described as having gone to college on the G.I. Bill for two
and one half years, and quit college to take a job on a small newspaper.
It is clear from this comparison that the court placed great value on
education. The court stressed the fact that higher learning had played a
great role in Bannister family history. Further, the court suggested that
Harold, as drop-out and potential custodian, did not have the "correct"
view of the matter of higher learning.
When the Painter court discussed college education, it was not
evaluating the experience or quality of cognitive, aesthetic, social,
moral and ethical learning. It was simply accepting that certain classes
required steps to gain traditional social status. The court's inquiry into
the social levels of each of the parties revealed that the court was more
interested in status than the quality of the mind. The court's emphasis
on the conventional, the middle class, and the stable, demonstrated that
"traditional" social status, represented by the Barristers, was a value
which the court emphasized. Education was viewed by the court as a
way one took his or her place in a social/economic hierarchy. The al-
ternative view, that education is an experience which can maximize the
growth of the cognitive, social, aesthetic and moral/ethical self, was
not addressed by the court. The court's failure to address these issues
flaws the Painter decision.
In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that if Mark were to
be placed in the custody of his father, he would have more "freedom of
conduct and thought."16 Moreover, the court admitted that life in the
Painter household would be more "intellectually stimulating." 1 1 How-
ever, the court failed to give the proper weight to this information or
facts. From a psychosocial developmental perspective, the Painter home
was the intellectually stimulating environment of choice. This home
setting would promote the development of Mark's cognitive processes,
and these processes are critical to Mark's future state of being.
From a best interests perspective Harold Painter would have been
a great custodian for Mark's learning stage (Stage IV). Harold Painter
was a widely travelled man, who had met people from all walks of life.
He had served in the U.S. Navy and had experienced life within the
159. Id. at 154.
160. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
161. Id. at 156.
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structure of the military. He had flunked out of high school because "of
a lack of interest in academic subjects, rather than any lack of abil-
ity.""' He had attended a trade school and had spent two and one half
years in college. Furthermore, he had worked as a newspaperman in
the states of Washington and Alaska. In addition, he had held a num-
ber of other kinds of jobs. Overall, Harold Painter had done and exper-
ienced a great deal and had a life perspective. He had proved himself
to be a skilled writer, one who could effectively use the language of his
culture, and a serious photographer. At the time of the custody hear-
ing, Harold Painter was planning a move to Berkeley, California.
Berkeley, home of a major university center, has been known as a com-
munity devoted to arts, humanities, sciences, politics and moral and
ethical issues of human history. A large number of creative, intelligent
and concerned people are always members of the Berkeley community,
and Berkeley has historically been an ideal environment for those inter-
ested in focused learning.
At the time of the original custody hearing, Mark's father was a
young, energetic individual with a self-actualizing attitude toward
learning. He sought to learn, not simply to earn a living, but also to
enrich his self and his interactions with others in society. On the other
hand, the Bannisters were over sixty years old at the time of the cus-
tody dispute. They were educated in the World War I era, and before
the Great Depression. Their cognitive styles and value sets were more
congruent with a culture on the wane than with the emerging modern
culture. The gap between the Bannisters and the new culture was just
too great, and they could not have maximized Mark's developmental
position. Moreover, Harold Painter's age was a factor which supported
his custody claim. All in all, a father in his thirties would possess more
psychic and physical energy than the grandparents in their sixties.
These varieties of energy are vital in the parent's task of promoting
best interests psycho-social development of the child. Further, Harold
Painter's new young wife was also capable of substantially supporting
Mark's intellectual, social, and aesthetic experience. She was an intelli-
gent, well educated woman, with a masters degree from the University
of California. Her specialty field was cinema design, an area of work
which surely requires cognitive and aesthetic capacity. 163 According to
the Court, Marilyn Painter liked children and had been in a position to
162. Id. at 154.
163. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 155.
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have "considerable contact" with them."' Harold and his new wife
clearly formed a dyad which was possessed of those capacities which
would promote Mark's development best interests.
In its opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court made it clear that stability
and security were more important for Mark than intellectual stimula-
tion. This position, of course, meant that custody be awared to the
grandparents. However, the court stated that Harold Painter was a fit
father, and it is clear that the case involved a learning age ("latency")
child. The court did not understand the process of child development in
our culture. It was not informed to what cognitive, aesthetic, moral/
ethical and social learning "in culture" meant in the process of self
formation. The court was unable to conceptualize the particular
psychosocial needs of the learning stage child in our modernized
culture.
Placement with Harold and his new wife, Marilyn, would have
been the appropriate best interests disposition. The intellectually and
aesthetically stimulating environment which they were able to provide
was exactly what Mark needed in order to prepare him for life in a
Toffleresque world. In such a world the ability to continue to learn was
extremely important. By 1965, the "old" approach to learning and the
"old" curriculum - the one that the Bannisters had experienced - was
clearly of diminished applicability. With the advent of the age of infor-
mation, communications and high technology, it should be clear that
Harold Painter was a fit parent and would provide a learning environ-
ment for Mark that would favor optimal best interests psycho-social
development. Harold Painter had pursued a life of learning, free ex-
pression and creativity. He had mastered the craft of writing and like
many aspiring writers had worked as a newspaperman. He had devel-
oped a "sense of purpose;165 he had intentions, objectives and life goals.
He operated as an open, expanding self system, preferring the study of
Zen Buddhism to less demanding activities. He was a Western man
who was willing to search the wisdom of the East for insights into be-
ing. Today it is not uncommon for seasoned corporate managers to seek
to learn from the philosophers of the Orient. Harold Painter, a man in
his thirties, was deeply involved in learning relevant to the emerging
new American culture, and he was a man of development.
As indicated earlier, the learning age child is undergoing moral
and ethical development, as well as cognitive, social, emotional, and
164. Id.
165. See ERIK ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 120-22 (1964).
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aesthetic development. Harold Painter, as portrayed in the Iowa Su-
preme Court's opinion, is a politically involved person. He is described
as a political liberal and a supporter of the activities of the American
Civil Liberties Union.' 66 He engaged in the political debates of his
time, and he had long been concerned about matters of right and
wrong, justice and injustice, the legitimacy of authority and the distri-
bution of values among the citizens of his country. Harold Painter was
an appropriate model of moral and ethical values for a learning age
child in a nation which keeps alive the ideology of democratic values.
Of course, the Bannisters moral and ethical perspective was typical of
those of their age and life stage. However, their vision of moral and
ethical life was such that they were not the persons who should have
received custody. Generationally and psychosocially, they appear to
have been too far removed from the moral and ethical milieu of Mark's
present and future.
Further, the court and Professor Goldstein failed to discuss age
appropriate sexuality (affectional/erotic behavior) and gender iden-
tity.16 7 Viewed from a psycho-social vantage point, this promotes an
incomplete best interests analysis. Mark would be entering adolescence
in the near future. 6 8 Sexuality and gender identity are critical issues at
that time, and had already become important issues in the learning
stage.
Dr. Hawks, the Bannister's expert witness, testified:
He is sensitive about sex, which one would expect of a seven year
old. Again, he has some questions and some anxieties about male-
ness. And the anxieties do show up. Mark is not free in his own
mind to discuss some of these anxieties about this, but he is con-
cerned about maleness, femaleness at this time.169
Learning age children are existentially engaged in an effort to orient
themselves on the issue of gender identity. They are attempting to de-
166. Id.
167. See generally ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD (Hildegard Hannun
& Hunter Hannun trans. 1983); ALICE MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE (Hilde-
gard Hannun & Hunter Hannun trans. 1984); ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILD-
HOOD (Ruth Ward trans. 1981) (these works provide one with real insight into the
psychology of the self).
168. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 156, at 421-25.
169. In Re Painter, No. 24921, at 21 (Dr. Hawks, amazingly, goes on to state
that this material is dangerous and should not be discussed).
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termine what the gender standards of being and action are in our cul-
ture. Moreover, there is an age appropriate interest in sexuality. Dr.
Hawks, testified that Mark was involved in the process of dealing with
these very fundamental matters. It can be inferred that Mark's difficul-
ties in regard to communicating his feelings about these matters
stemmed from his experience with the Bannisters. Their views on sexu-
ality and gender identity were old fashioned and, given that fact, it was
highly likely that they did not deal in "modern style" with questions of
sexuality and gender identity. Their personal ethic dictated that Mark
be shielded from direct, age appropriate handling of these fundamental
issues. In addition, it would be reasonable to surmise that they were
overly repressive in regard to the sexual interest and action of children.
Mark's father, on the other hand, was a free thinker and free spirit: a
person open to the process of cultural change. It is unlikely that he
would be responsible for the creation of Mark's anxiety and sensitivity.
Harold Painter, and his wife Marilyn, appeared to have been a
young., energetic couple. Harold had been able to achieve affectional
and erotic intimacy during his life.' 7 ' He had formed a family and had
fathered children. His life history indicated that he was attuned to con-
temporary models of masculinity and femininity.' 7 ' Both he and
Marilyn are capable of providing the appropriate environment for
Mark's development of culture-acceptable gender identity and sexual
behavior orientation. Parents, and custodians, who provide such a de-
velopmental setting during the learning stage are normally capable of
coping well with gender identity and sexuality issues which are
presented during adolescence. 17 Speaking comparatively, Mark's self
development along gender identity and sexuality lines would have been
most effectively enhanced by placement with his father and his father's
new wife.
Further, Mark would be moving into adolescence. In our culture,
adolescence is a very special phase of psycho-social development. 73 To
appropriately decide a child custody case involving a learning stage
child, one must think not only about the parents, but must engage in a
170. See ERICKSON, supra note 7, at 70-72.
171. See generally IVAN ILLICH, GENDER (1982) (an excellent work on gender
identity); see also P. SLATER, FOOTHOLDS (1977) (also containing valuable information
on gender identity).
172. See generally E. FRIED, THE EGO IN LOVE AND SEXUALITY (1966) (on the
importance of love and sexuality in the adult years).
173. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 156, at 425-32.
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prospective analysis which considers the psycho-social situation of the
child in adolescence. Both the court and Professor Goldstein fail to fo-
cus on this best interest consideration.
Adolescence is a time of biological maturation, rite of passage,
strong sexual emphasis and finding one's way. 17 ' There is certainly a
great deal going on in this phase of development (Erikson's Stage V).
However, the complexity of legal decision-making in regard to this
stage of development can be dealt with if we organize our thinking
around a very fundamental idea. Developmentally, adolescence is char-
acterized by the young person's search for an authentic "sense of iden-
tity."'1 75 Identity, as used here, refers to one's sense of individual con-
tinuity. Consolidating a sense of identity at this stage means
integrating the self so that one is prepared to move into young
adulthood.
Lawyers and judges must keep in mind that the quest for identity
is an essential task of adolescence. Identity cannot be assigned to the
adolescent by parents, court, or society. The "sense of identity" must
be acquired over protracted time through individual interaction with
others in our culture who are available as identity models. Experimen-
tation and choice are critical in the acquisition of this fundamental
sense of self. The very way in which a young person acquires her or his
identity gives adolescence a variable, protean quality. Out of psycholog-
ical necessity, adolescents are shape shifters, they appear in different
forms at different times. Self experimentation is the science of adoles-
cent identity research. Ideologies, styles, behaviors, and perspectives
are donned and doffed. Revisionism is the rule and the process of revi-
sion is critical to psycho-social development. In our culture, this process
is essential in developing a "sense of identity." The adolescent may de-
velop an authentic "sense of identity," drift on the sea of "identity con-
fusion" or develop a "negative identity." ' The preferred result is the
construction of an authentic "sense of identity." "Identity confusion" is
not a positive outcome because it leaves one prey to anxiety and insecu-
rity. A "negative identity," for example, that of "delinquent," ".addict"
or "criminal," jeopardizes one's opportunity for a life free of legal
stigma and social and psychological deprivation. Both the Iowa Su-
174. Id. at 419-77.
175. ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
176. See ERIKSON, supra note 163 and accompanying text. "Identity confusion"
and "negative identity" are not positive outcomes. One's life will not be enhanced by
one's achieving one or the other.
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preme Court and Professor Goldstein failed to consider the relationship
between a best interest decision and the task of adolescence.
Recall that the Bannisters were in their sixties at the time of the
appellate decision. By the time Mark graduated from high school they
would have been past age seventy. Given their ages, their philosophy of
life, and their life style, it was not in Mark's best interests for the Ban-
nisters to be awarded custody. The Bannisters were not best suited to
deal with the vicissitudes of adolescence. In comparison to Harold
Painter, they had much less of the flexibility required to deal with the
emerging adolescent identity models of the 1960's and early 1970's.
The "fit" required between Mark, the culture and the grandparents did
not exist. Harold Painter's life history indicated that he had worked
hard at. achieving a culture-appropriate authentic "sense of identity." It
is a fair inference from the facts, that he searched, revised, experi-
mented. and achieved identity continuity. Moreover, given his openness
and vitality, he appeared to be a person who would be able to accept
the shape shifting and revisionism of Mark's adolescent stage of devel-
opment. Further, his adolescence would be historically "closer" to
Mark's than the adolescent periods of Mr. and Mrs. Bannister. In addi-
tion, his wife Marilyn's age and social experience also made her well-
equipped to participate in Mark's coming of age.
The Iowa Supreme Court's and Professor Goldstein's emphasis on
continuity of relationship does not make it possible to arrive at a true
best interests decision. There is no room for the complexities of adoles-
cence within the monism of the continuity concept. A best interests
decision can be reached only if psychosocial reality is comprehensively
considered.
The preceding particularized discussion of Painter v. Bannister,17
from the psychosocial best interests perspective, clearly demonstrates
that the zealous judicial application of the continuity concept, and the
psychological parent model, may well result in child custody decisions
which are more reflexive than wise.
IV. THE CRITIQUE EXTENDED
As indicated, the BBI approach may produce decision outcomes
which do not meet the child's psycho-social best interests, however, the
strict application of the model may beget monsters of jurisprudential
injustice. Consider the following question and testimony from Hoy v.
177. 140 N.W.2d 152.
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Willis.17 8 On cross-examination the testifying expert, Dr. Hollander, a
proponent of continuity was asked:
If a couple kidnapped an infant, kept it for four years and within
that four years they became the psychological parents of the child
and if both the parents and the kidnappers were equal in all re-
spects would it be in the best interests of the child to continue cus-
tody with the kidnappers?17 9
The expert said "yes."' 80 Such a decision would surely be wild justice.
The application of the continuity and psychological parent concepts to
such a fact pattern could only be the product of a professional scotoma
which impairs one's capacity to see the full array of values our culture
apply to such a case.
How Goldstein or Solnit would evaluate the preceding case is un-
known. 81 However, on cross-examination in a custody case, Goldstein
was asked to assume that a non-custodial parent had kidnapped a child
from the custodial parent. It was hypothesized that several months had
passed before the child was located. Goldstein was then asked to as-
sume that the child had developed a real psychological attachment to
the "kidnapping" parent. Goldstein was asked whether the court ought
to leave the child with the parent who abducted the child. In offering
his opinion, Professor Goldstein characterized the act as kidnapping
but went on to say:
If a new and meaningful relationship had developed over a suffi-
cient period of time, I would be very reluctant, from the child's
point of view, to move that child, and I think I am responding to
your question, because to move that child in order to protect the
State's policy with regard to kidnapping is to use the child as a
chattel, which is what we are moving away from. . . .My answer
is if the child is thriving, and a substantial period of time has gone
by where the old ties have begun to dissolve or break down, and
new meaningful ties have developed, that I would, from the child's
vantage point, I would leave him there.9 2
178. 398 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
179. id. at 111.
180. Id.
181. I omit Ms. Freud from the matter as she died approximately five years ago.
182. See JUDITH AREEN, CASES & MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 518-19 (1982).
This quote is taken from the case styled, Rose v. Rose, however, the parties names have
been changed by Professor Areen to protect their privacy.
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Certainly, a "kidnapping" by a parent differs from kidnapping by
a stranger. In the case of the abduction by the parent, there normally
exists a prior affectional and psycho-social relationship. Thus, the tak-
ing is certainly not as reprehensible as the taking by the stranger. It is
highly unlikely that a stranger who abducts a child would be a fit
psycho-social parent. However, it seems that to ignore community ideas
about justice and the law and to adhere strictly to the BBI paradigm
view of the case is to accept a jurisprudential vision which inhibits our
ability to do substantial justice in complex cases.
It must be kept in mind that the family law perspective is only one
of many perspectives. We must recognize that there are a number of
interests, values, and systems perspectives which ought to be considered
in decisions at an interface.18 Children's psychological interests are
very important but there are other rights and interests to be considered.
Certainly when we are confronted with unusual cases such as the kid-
napping cases, we must remember that they are not examples of the
custody cases we normally encounter. Such unusual cases exist as a
special class of cases which are best examined from the vantage points
of constitutional law, criminal justice policy-making, the policy under-
pinnings of family law jurisprudence, and our moral/ethical vision. The
kidnapping cases are hybrids which analytically cannot be contained by
a model constructed for application in child placement disputes. Dr.
Hollander and Professor Goldstein are consistent given their theoretical
starting point, however, the complexity of reality calls for outcomes
which do not reward the wrongdoers and deprive the custodians.
We turn now to a consideration of the BBI paradigm in relation to
the time-honored practice of courts granting visitation rights. In Pierce
v. Yerkovich,8 Professor Solnit testified as a expert witness. The case
involved an effort by the acknowledged father of a five-year old child to
have his right of visitation recognized and enforced against a mother
who denied him access to the child. The Court, in deciding Pierce,
summarized Professor Solnit's basic position in these words:
In short, the professor's thesis, although variously stated is that it
serves the best interests of the child with the least detriment to
have his custodial parent, the one with whom the child lives, rather
than a court, make the determination as to when and under what
183. See M. McDOUGAL, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1980).
184. 363 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974).
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circumstance, if at all, the noncustodial parent should be permitted
visitation with their child. 188
The Court then made the following comment:
This is indeed, a novel and startling doctrine, and if accepted liter-
ally as Professor Solnit and his co-authors Goldstein and Freud se-
riously urge, would leave the court shorn of much of its traditional
role as parens patriae and guardian of the child's best interest.
Quite frankly, I do not believe that the law of this state would
tolerate this court, charged as it is with a responsibility for the wel-
fare of children so supinely and abjectly abdicating its function to
any parent, however well intentioned. 186
Rejecting the BBI approach, the court held that the custodian
mother did not have the right to determine whether or not the noncus-
todial father should be permitted visitation. That decision belonged to
the court. The court pointed out that a child has two parents and the
fact that the parents do not live together cannot negate the existence of
the two parent situation. The court concluded that it was in the child's
best interests to have contact with the father. The Pierce case demon-
strates the reality of the advocacy of the BBI paradigm in the arena of
everyday decision-making.
The basic BBI position on court ordered visitation is that it may in
fact be a "source of discontinuity. ' 187 The non-custodian, visiting par-
ent is perceived as being a potential threat to the continuity of relation-
ship which exists between the child and custodian. The emphasis is
again on continuity. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud reason that the child
has a difficult time relating to "two psychological parents who are not
in positive contact with each other."'188 They state that conflicts in re-
gard to loyalty can destroy the child's relationship with both of the
parents. Further, they argue that the non-custodial parent will have
little opportunity to promote the child's psychological position, because
that can only be done by one who is available on a continual and unin-
terrupted basis. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit assert a child traumatized
by separation or divorce is appropriately protected only if the child is
permitted to "settle down in the privacy of their reorganized family
185. Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. BBI (1979), supra note 4.
188. Id. at 209.
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with one person in authority upon whom they can rely for answers to
their questions and for protection from external influence."1 89 The BBI
group's belief is that by ordering visitation, a court undercuts the
child's trust in the parent, the parent's authority and the capacity of
the custodian to parent.
I dissent strongly from this view. Granting the custodial parent the
authority to determine visitation rights is not in the child's best inter-
ests. On the contrary, it promotes the child's best interests for decision-
makers to act in accord with a checks and balances "philosophy." A
decision-maker approach which emphasizes feedback carries with it the
opportunity to prevent runaway.1 90 A valid best interests model must fit
the reality of human life. The truth is that custodians are not always
perfect people. The best of them have their ups and downs. All too
often they can manifest very real psychopathology which can cause
them to do emotional and/or physical harm to the child. Alice Miller, a
Swiss "non-orthodox" psychoanalyst has made this clear in her recent
landmark publications.19" ' Miller's clinical work demonstrates that par-
ents often use their children to fulfill their egoistic wishes. The results
for the child are confusion, depression, alienation, pathological grandi-
osity, contempt for self and/or others and the inability to achieve inti-
macy. No one parent should be permitted to wall off a child from con-
cerned others. What we have learned about the physical and sexual
abuse of children in our culture should make us wary of totalistic au-
thority systems from which concerned adults are excluded."'
The psychoanalyst, Bruno Bettelheim, who has written' 93 on chil-
dren growing up in the multiple caretaker environment, a kibbutz in
Israel, stated: "[i]n the kibbutz, things can never get as bad as they
may between a lone mother [or father] and her infant, because there is
more than one person taking care of the infant."' 94 The preceding re-
quires us to oppose the BBI group's stand on court ordered visitation.
Single parent totalism is not in the best interests of the young.
The BBI approach is objectionable for other important reasons.
After divorce the psychological ties between the child and the non-cus-
189. Id. at 117.
190. See generally GREGORY BATESON, MIND AND NATURE: A NECESSARY
UNITY (paperback ed. 1980).
191. See MILLER, supra note 167.
192. See, e.g., FLORENCE RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN (1981); RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE (1978).
193. BRUNO BETTELHEIM, CHILDREN OF THE DREAM (1978).
194. Id. at 137.
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todian continue to exist.195 Both the child and the non-custodian have
important relational interests which deserve protection. It is obvious
that people need not live together in order to have on-going relation-
ships. Furthermore, it may be quite important for both child and non-
custodial parent to continue to have contact. For example, a young
male child may have his psychological best interests served by main-
taining contact with a non-custodian father who has been serving as a
gender identity model. To disrupt this relationship might well be an act
against the child's best interests. The BBI group errs when they state
that a child cannot relate affirmatively to two parents who have made
the decision to end the marriage. 9" There is evidence to the contrary.
One can use counselling, mediation and the power of the court to pro-
mote rational interaction. 197
Parents can learn to grow beyond the old domestic conflicts and
come to terms with a new way of co-existence which benefits the child.
After divorce, life need not be an eternal cold war between the parents.
Turning to modification of custody decrees, the law is that custody
orders can be modified if a change of circumstances can be demon-
strated to the court.'98 The kind of change of circumstances contem-
plated by the law is that which substantially effects the child's best
interests.'99 Historically, it has been our collective public policy prefer-
ence that cases can be reviewed to determine whether or not a child's
best interests are being protected.
The BBI group rejects the traditional rule of law. They argue that
the law of modification invites judicial challenge by non-custodian and
consequently is a threat to continuity of relationship. For this reason,
they contend that custody decrees should be final and not subject to
modification.200 Again, their emphasis on continuity stands in the way
of a true best interests analysis.
Let us consider a simple illustrative example. A custodian mother
195. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK UP:
How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 311 (1980) (giving details relat-
ing to this point).
196. See Susan Steinman, What We Know, What We Have Yet To Learn, and
the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739, 743 (1983)
(refuting this BBI position).
197. See CIJI WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD AFTER DIVORCE 11-13 (Bantam
ed. 1984).
198. See CLARK, supra note 68, at 598.
199. Id. at 600.
200. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 37.
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may have done a satisfactory job of raising a boy up to age eight. How-
ever, the facts may indicate that at the learning stage of development,
the mother is failing to do a best interests job of optimizing his cogni-
tive, social, and moral and ethical development. In fact, to a neutral
observer it appears that she has lost interest in the boy. This is not an
uncommon situation. Custodian parents, fathers or mothers, can grow
psychologically distant from their children. Assume that the facts
demonstrate that the father is highly motivated and well qualified to
promote the boy's best interests development. Given such a case, it is
wise public policy to maintain a legal standard which authorizes the
court to modify the custody arrangement. Substantial changes in cir-
cumstances will often impact on the best interests situation. Children's
lives are important and must have the protection of the law. A policy
preference which places the child at the total mercy of one parent until
the end of adolescence can do very little to insure justice for the young.
Given the preceding and the BBI group position, it should come as
no surprise that the creators of the paradigm view court ordered joint
custody20 1 as another significant threat to continuity of relationship.
Professor Goldstein made this clear2 02 when he stated that the author-
ity of the law should not be used to require an objecting parent to par-
ticipate in a joint custody arrangement. 03 Court ordered joint custody,
according to Professor Goldstein, undermines the process of psychologi-
cal bonding between the child and parent because the parents in such
cases are in conflict."" He holds that this state of conflict will produce
discontinuity.
It is the BBI position that if the parents cannot reach an agree-
ment on joint custody, they reveal themselves as "unfit to decide cus-
tody." 0 Professor Goldstein declares that the court should quickly
award custody to the parent of attachment.2 06 Mediation, negotiation,
counselling, and arbitration are not perceived as being as applicable
201. See Carolyn S. Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Kv. L. 271 (1978) (for an excel-
lent "pioneer work" on joint custody).
202. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 47.
203. Id. at 46. Professor Goldstein indicates that joint custody determined by
agreement of the parties is satisfactory; however, if agreement cannot be reached ini-
tially or maintained once reached then there can be no joint custody because the mat-
ter must be submitted to the court and according to Professor Goldstein the above
situation serves to place continuity of relationship in jeopardy.
204. Id. at 48.
205. Id. at 51.
206. Id.
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alternative approaches. A failure to agree on joint custody is held to be
a crisis situation. The child is seen as being in jeopardy. The BBI judg-
ment is that the child's psychological interest can be protected only if
the child is placed immediately in the custody of one person with full
authority.207
A close reading of Professor Goldstein's 1984 article reveals that
he is, in truth, no friend of any type of, agreed or ordered, joint cus-
tody. He writes "[w]hen the fad for joint custody agreements fades, we
will begin to realize how costly it, like other magic formulas, has been
to children."208
Note that he refers to joint custody agreements as a "fad" and as
"magic formulas." This is certainly strong labelling. The implication is
that those who support joint custody have not truly engaged in the req-
uisite reflection and analysis. Although the BBI group favors contact
between the non-custodian and the child, Professor Goldstein states
"[e]ven if requested by both parents we would object to courts making
a visitation or joint custody agreement a part of a decree. "209
Note that an acceptance of this notion in regard to joint custody
would mean that the agreement would in reality have no authoritative
significance. People are invited to act capriciously. Under this ap-
proach, no one has any legally protected rights. 10
In discussing joint custody, Professor Goldstein states that he and
his co-workers "reasoned from the child's point of view .... " 12 This
position is not supportable. Judith Wallerstein, a psychologist trained in
psychoanalysis, who conducted a long-term psychosocial study of one
hundred and ninety-one children from families of divorce wrote
"[t]here is considerable evidence that the relationship between the
207. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52.
208. Id. at 54.
209. Id. at 53.
210. Further, it should be noted that the footnotes to Professor Goldstein's article
contain not one source from the legal, and sociological literature on joint custody. And,
in fact, his only citation to the psychological literature is to a paper published in 1926
by Sigmund Freud. 20 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 87-174 (James Strachey ed. 1959). Freud, of course,
never evaluated joint custody from a clinical or a theoretical psychoanalytic perspec-
tive. There was no joint custody phenomenon to be studied during Freud's time. More-
over, orthodox psychoanalysts practicing in the years since Freud's death have not sys-
tematically studied joint custody. Further, it is clear that there is an unwillingness to
directly counter the findings of those whose work indicates that joint custody can at
times well serve the best interests of the child.
211. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52.
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child in the divorced family and both of his or her parents does not
diminish in emotional importance within the post-divorce family. 2 12
Wallerstein's work is important because it is, in a very real sense,
"in context" field work. Wallerstein evaluated the children at home and
in the school setting, not simply in an office clinical setting. Her re-
search leads her to believe that in many cases joint custody can, under
certain situations, promote the emotional best interests of the child.
She is aware that a child under the sole control of a lonely, post-divorce
emotionally dysfunctional parent is likely to suffer.13 Wallerstein
knows that joint custody can act to neutralize the negative effects of
interaction with a psychologically dysfunctional parent. The results of
Wallerstein's work indicate that, in some cases, people are not able to
overcome their hostility.214 As a consequence they may not able to act
responsibly, and joint custody will not work in these cases. It is clear
that her work demonstrates that joint custody in a number of cases is a
viable alternative to sole custody.
Susan Steinman, another social science researcher writing for a
law journal audience, in referring to a group of joint custody children
she studied stated:
These children clearly had two psychological parents to whom they
were positively attached and loyal, despite the marital split. This
does not support the assumption in Freud, Solnit and Goldstein's,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child that children cannot relate
well to two separated parents who are not in positive relation to one
another. 21 5
Steinman's view is strikingly different from the position put forward by
the BBI group. As Steinman perceives it, the Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit view is no more than an assumption. It is not the product of solid
in-the-environment research. My participant/observer experience and
my reading of the relevant research work causes me to support the
212. Judith Wallerstein, The Child In The Divorcing Family, in THE RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 106 (J. Henning ed. 1982). Dr.
Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee state that the custody arrangement itself does not
determine the child's future. It is the experience with people which is crucial. JUDITH
S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 271 (1989).
213. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 212, at 108.
214. Id. at 109.
215. See Steinman, supra note 196, at 747.
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Steinman view.
Psychologist Joan B. Kelly points out that parents who divorce
usually have not been in conflict about the approach to child rearing.2 16
This is an important finding. The non-existence of a conflict in regard
to parenting smooths the way to workable joint custody. In addition,
Kelly's research indicates that children do better psychologically when
there is contact with both parents. 17 Once again, the research results
refute the BBI position.
The BBI group has failed to recognize certain realities which lim-
its their understanding in joint custody matters. The juridical and so-
cial situation is that, in approximately ninety percent of all cases, it is
the mother who becomes the custodian.2 18 About eighty percent of di-
vorced mothers with custody work outside the home 21  and their in-
comes are notoriously low. 220 In addition, child support is all too often
not paid by obligors.2 21 The majority of mothers in our culture are not
able to remain at home and perform the "traditional" mother's role.
Today's mothers must rely on babysitters, relatives, day care, kinder-
garten, and the schools to support them in parenthood.
It is only at the end of a long day of work that most mothers come
home to act as parent. One could forcefully argue that a sole custodian
mother is the victim of Kafkaesque form of punishment.22 Her second
stint of "compulsory" labor for the day begins when she arrives home.
Often she returns to the domestic scene physically fatigued and emo-
tionally overloaded or drained. Quite often while a mother-in-custody is
trying to cope with employment and the task of child care, she is en-
deavoring to restructure her own life line. The woman finds that, in
addition to working and taking care of the parenting task, she must
chart and navigate the new culture of divorce. The reality is that very
few mothers are able to sit at home all day in continuity of relationship
with their children. In the evening, after a full day on the job, these
women often are unable to put forth a psychological best interests ef-
216. See Joan B. Kelly, Further Observations On Joint Custody, 16 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 762 (1983).
217. Id. at 764-65.
218. See MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 23
(1978).
219. See WARE, supra note 197, at 44.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Kafkaesque means nightmarishly strange, mystifying, and bizarre. THE
RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 729 (revised ed. 1980).
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fort. These women need and deserve all the help they can get. Respon-
sibility ought to be shared. Joint (shared) custody can do much to re-
lieve the mother (or father) custodian of an excessive psychological
(and physical) burden which derives from social and economic realities.
The sharing of responsibility and contact with the child will reduce the
stress on any one parent and can dramatically enrich the child's life.
Furthermore, in today's world of accelerated social and psychological
change, a shared custody arrangement can greatly increase the child's
exposure to evolving forms of human attachment and relationships. The
greater the number of fit and concerned caretakers, including signifi-
cant others available, and the more diverse the child's social contacts,
the more likely it is that the child's psychological and social develop-
ment will be enhanced . 2 8 The continuity concept is simply not compre-
hensive enough to be useful in dealing with the dynamics of legal and
human reality.
In order to fully understand the BBI position on joint custody, it is
necessary to examine the concept of "family" and "authority". Beneath
the verbal structure of the BBI paradigm exists a psychological and
social commitment to a particular concept of the "family". This family
of preference might well be labelled the family-of-privacy.2 It is most
often known as the traditional or nuclear family. This type of family is
rooted in the Western middle class family structure which came into
prominence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 25 The context
of its creation was the culture of the industrializing nations of Western
Europe. This family-of-privacy was the product of particular social, ec-
onomic and historical forces. 22 6 This new family structure was a "cre-
ated" form; it did not derive from biological compulsion. It is virtually
a law of history that cultural ideology in large measure determines the
idealized family form of a particular period of history. However, it is
here pointed out that not everyone in the Western world has grown up
in a family-of-privacy. The poor generally have not been able to afford
to live in this manner. 27 And, in fact, those children who have lived in
this "traditional" family have been subjected to isolation, instruction in
individualization and competition, and split off from life in the broader
223. See BETTELHEIM, supra note 193, at 137.
224. BBI (1979) supra note 204, at 7.
225. See PHILLIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD, 365-404 (1962).
226. Id.
227. See JOEL KOVEL, THE AGE OF DESIRE 108-33 (1981). Perhaps the family-
of-privacy has been more a fantasy than a reality.
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community. 2 8 This family-of-privacy does much to make the child ex-
ceedingly dependent on the parents. Further, it is arguable that the
family-of-privacy and its social alienation inducing tendencies have
contributed to the absence of genuine community in our time." 9 Psy-
choanalysts and other therapists have treated enormous numbers of
people who were victims of this family structure.280 This is not to say
that privacy-in-itself is valueless. Traditional families are as important
as any other form of family. However, privacy has been overstressed in
Western culture. The truth is that in our time the family-of-privacy is
simply one living style among many. Our culture has changed dramati-
cally and will continue to change.
The perfect traditional family of today is an experience most peo-
ple will not have. It is clear that the nuclear family with strictly as-
signed "traditional" sex roles is on the wane. It is well known that sin-
gle-parent families and blended families are common. Certainly the
line between the family and the broader culture of day care center,
school, media, and recreational life, has been blurred and new forms of
relationships between family members and "outsiders" have come into
being.231 The family-of-privacy is not the only reality which one sees in
the world, Reality is other than the proponents of orthodox psychoanal-
ysis would have us believe, and a theory-determined preference for the
family-of-privacy, or traditional family, can do little to help us fashion
sound legal policy to produce realistic court custody decisions. We are
best advised to study things as they truly are. Continuity of relationship
with a psychological parent in a family-of-privacy is an image too re-
moved from contemporary realities to guide legal decision-making.
According to the BBI originators, the family-of-privacy has "one
person in authority."' 32 This person protects the child from outsiders
and acts as the fount of all wisdom. This monotheism is a hangover
from older patriarchal times. 3 The patriarchal era is coming to an
end, but the predeliction of some for mono-authority survives. One
should not be concerned that in the BBI post-divorce and post-separa-
tion family, the new single authority is most frequently the mother.
228. Id.
229. See Bruno Bettelheim, Some Comments on Privacy, in SURVIVING AND
OTHER ESSAYS 399-411 (1979).
230. See R. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: A STUDY IN SANITY AND MADNESS
(1960).
231. See WARE, supra note 197.
232. BBI (1979), supra note 204, at 117.
233. See generally ERIK FROMM, THE CRISIS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 110-35 (1976).
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The determinative logic is not of gender, but structural form. The
"placing" of authority in one pre-eminent being is what is important.
This position on authority and the family is directly derivative of the
patriarchal cultural origins and the mono-authority bias of psychoanal-
ysis. It is certainly fair to state that Freud was a very powerful mono-
authority who dominated orthodox psychoanalysis. 34 In addition, psy-
choanalytic treatment with the analyst in charge and the analysand
("patient") in Transference'" is a very "private" little dyadic "family"
situation. The person receiving analysis is the child and the analyst is
the parent (authority figure). The preference for authority and privacy
displayed in the work of the BBI group appears to be rooted in the
history and method of psychoanalysis. We cannot, however, allow ideas
which fit the history of psychoanalysis and the treatment of people in
analysis to be implemented in legal reality if they do not "fit." In our
time, authority for the child comes from many sources, in many forms.
It comes from two parents, one parent, a grandmother, uncles, aunts,
other relatives, day care workers, babysitters, television, peers, older
children, teachers, and other unrelated adults. The elements of author-
ity can be combined into a multiplicity of possible configurations. Tele-
vision, by itself, has radically reworked the topography of authority.
Today norms and values are electronically projected. Authority, to a
very great extent, is imaged up on the 525 "lines" of the television
screen.
In passing judgment on the sharing of responsibility for the child
through joint custody and visitation, we are best advised to accept so-
cial reality and avoid the BBI preference for mono-authority. Joint cus-
tody can, in many cases, do much to promote the child's psychological
best interests. Outdated views on authority can serve as no significant
support for the continuity of relationship concept.
To this point, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the
continuity concept (and the related idea of the psychological parent)
because it is the quintessence of the legal and psychological BBI para-
digm. It is clear that Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's views on custody
dispute outcomes, visitation, modification of custody and joint custody
234. See 0. MANNONI, FREUD 108 (Vintage 1st ed. 1974). My basic contention
is that Freud, as the leader of an "outcast" movement, felt it necessary to set himself
up as the authority. He, like Moses, became the "law-giver."
235. In transference the analysand-driven by the unconscious-is psychologically
deeply involved with the analyst. See ANDREW WATSON, supra note 119, at 2-8 (dis-
cussing transference).
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are overwhelmingly determined by their penchant for the continuity
concept. In fact, a dedicated reductionist might argue that beyond the
continuity concept, all is but tautology. Logic supports such a view.
The truth is that all other formal elements of the BBI paradigm are
derivative of the continuity concept. The paradigm is, in fact, a logic
loop. This is, of course, why this article has devoted so much effort to
an extensive explication of this central concept. All other BBI para-
digm ideas are simply secondary. For this reason only a relatively small
part of this article will now be devoted to a discussion of "the child's
sense of time,"2 6 the law's inability to make predictions, "237 and "the
least detrimental alternative"2 8 test.
The BBI group has stated that "the child's sense of time" is an
integral part of the continuity concept. 3 ' They argue that custody
cases are potentially quite destructive of continuity, and therefore, must
be heard quickly and decided with dispatch, keeping the continuity
concept in mind. Because a rapid movement to finality of decision is
necessary to protect the child's psychological interests, the appellate
process must also be accelerated. Basically, the task of the court is to
determine quickly with whom the child is in continuity.240 The funda-
mental issue, put another way, is: who is the psychological parent? This
person, if fit, becomes the sole legal custodian. While I agree that final
decisions in these cases are too often needlessly delayed, I cannot fully
accept this position. It is clear that the sense of time concept is inextri-
cably tied to the continuity concept. "[T]he child's sense of time" idea,
can rise intellectually no higher than the whole continuity concept. The
continuity concept clearly does not take into account such fundamental
matters as the child's particular needs, the adult's fitness in regard to
these needs, and the benefit of contact with both parents, etc. In the
abstract, most would agree that it is important to decide custody cases
as quickly as is reasonably possible. It is best to decide on arrange-
ments, work out the necessary plans and get people going in a new life
pattern. However, the BBI approach would appear to be a rush to cus-
tody. To rush to finality is to commit judicial errors. It takes a signifi-
cant period of time to gather the relevant best interest facts, analyze
them and place them before the judge. Further, the court should al-
236. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 40-49.
237. Id. at 49-52.
238. Id. at 53-64.
239. Id. at 40.
240. Id. at 42-43.
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ways carefully evaluate the material presented by counsel, parties, wit-
nesses, etc. Mediation, counseling and negotiation, all recognized as-
pects of our system, take time if we are truly to further the child's best
interests.. In addition, appropriate appellate review takes time. We can
expedite, but a bullet train process will not serve the child's best
interests.
In summary, the "child's sense of time" idea is of very limited
utility for two reasons: first, because it is bound to the flawed continuity
concept; second, because it does not take into account the time realities
of gathering and fairly evaluating the information necessary to the
court's making of best interests decisions.
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit believe that the law is but a crude
"instrument" 24 for dealing with that legal problem which we call the
child custody case. The BBI group argues that the law can recognize
relationships and allow them to evolve. In addition, Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit stress their belief that the law does not have the resources to
monitor relationships on a day to day basis. 2 It is their view that the
law cannot predict a child's future needs and future events which im-
pact upon that child.24 3 Because of this perceived defect in the legal
process, the BBI group states that no conditions should be imposed on
the custodian.2 ' Private ordering should prevail. 24 15 However, Gold-
stein, Freud and Solnit do believe that there is enough knowledge avail-
able to judges so that a limited number of things can be done with
some assurance. It is possible, according to the BBI proponents, for the
judge to identify which person among those contending for custody is a
psychological parent or has the capacity to be such a parent. 46 They
state that it is possible to predict that the person most suited to be
custodian is the person with whom the child has had a relatively long
term, continuous psychological attachment.247 Finally, we are told that
separation from the psychological parent and uncertainty in regard to
placement will do significant psychological damage to the child. 8
Admittedly, the law cannot determine life on a day-to-day basis.
This is self evident. Furthermore, it is not possible for decision-makers
241. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 49-50.
242. Id. at 50.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 52.
245. Id. at 50.
246. Id. at 51.
247. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 51.
248. Id.
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to predict exactly what the future has in store for a child. The great
majority of judges do not strive to act as supervisors who seek to med-
dle in the on-going everyday life of the family. Professor Goldstein has
the impression that the judiciary is overly concerned with the control of
family life." 9 My view is that in the bulk of the cases, judges make a
sincere effort to insure that best interests decisions are implemented. 25 0
Intervention is relatively limited. Questions of visitation and support do
come to court, but there is no day-to-day "supervision," and most
judges are not interested in performing such monitoring. As to the
law's capacity to predict and impose conditions, visitation is the condi-
tion which most concerns the BBI group.2 5' Generally, they oppose it.
Although visitation is a "condition," in a sense, a visitation decision is
not an attempt to "predict" the future. A visitation decision is primar-
ily an "in the present" effort to adjudicate rights in the best interests of
the child. The same is true of a decision regarding shared custody. I
doubt that the judicial assumption is that scientific forecasts of the fu-
ture are being made. However, the law does make special provisions for
the future. Under prevailing norms, the courts have the power to mod-
ify decrees in order to protect the child's best interests. 52 Every exper-
ienced judge is aware that things can change and that it may be neces-
sary, in the future, to change arrangements regarding custody,
visitation, etc.
The fundamental position the courts take is: "Let us try to make
the best decision we can now, hopefully it will hold up in the future."
The law's view is that if things change substantially, the new situation
will be dealt with through a change in custody or some other appropri-
ate remedy.
The BBI position on prediction and conditions is in large part an
extension of their preference for a private ordering. 53 This preference
would appear to derive from their positions on familial mono-authority.
As a result of this orientation it is arguable that they wish to limit the
law's jurisdiction. The BBI group leaves to the judge the task of deter-
mining who is the psychological parent in continuity. This, of course, is
249. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52.
250. See MICHAEL WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN 52-71 (1981). My partici-
pant/observer field research gives me a high degree of confidence in the view expressed
in the text.
251. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 37-38.
252. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 847-62 (3rd
ed. 1990).
253. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 50.
[Vol. 16
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/3
1992]
a rather simple task. It comes down to who cares for the child most of
the time? Note that the judge is not to concern herself or himself with
the child's full range of best interests needs. The BBI group desires not
only to prevent the courts from making decisions pointed at the future,
but wishes to deny the courts the right to impose any conditions, such
as visitation, which undercut the authority of the parent-in-custody.
The BBI group undoubtedly takes this stand because they wish to sup-
port the continuity concept from all conceivable directions.
Finally, the BBI idea that we can predict that children will be
harmed by separation from the psychological parent and damaged by
uncertainty produced in cases which are not disposed of rapidly, does
not take us far enough. It, at first glance, engages our sympathy, but it
seems evident that a rush to judgment is not in the child's long term
best interests. Substantial justice only can be done by a comprehensive
best interests, psychosocial, analysis.
At this juncture, we turn to the ultimate element in the BBI para-
digm: the least detrimental alternative. 2 ' It is the BBI's groups substi-
tution for the time-honored best interest test. This element, when care-
fully analyzed, turns out to be a specific custody placement and
procedure for placement which is made in accordance with the BBI
groups views on continuity, the child's sense of time, and the law's limi-
tation in regard to prediction. The fact is that the least detrimental
alternative idea is but the final "legal test" element in the great logic
loop which makes up the paradigm. Aptly translated, least deteri-
mental alternative means that cases are to be decided in accordance
with the three preceding main elements of the Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit model. Reduced to operational reality it means that all decisions
must be based on the continuity concept.
The BBI group states that the least detrimental alternative stan-
dard is to be preferred because it emphasizes the fact that the children
of divorce and custody disputes are victims who are at risk.2 55 From
their point of view, a custody decision is just a matter of making the
best of a. bad bargain. 56 I cannot share this extraordinarily pessimistic
outlook. Divorce, separation, and the necessity of making custody de-
terminations are cultural and historical realities. Life changes and loss
of relationships are something human beings learn to deal with.25 7 If
254. Id. at 53-64.
255. Id. at 54.
256. Id. at 63.
257. See BOWLBY, supra note 89.
Baitt
51
Batt: Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Bes Interests Paradigm:
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
things are done in the right spirit and with social support, things can
work out. It is certainly possible that, in many cases, the child's post-
divorce life can turn out to be better than the child's pre-divorce life.
The BBI "legal test" seems to be the product of Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit's inability to see family break-up in the light of modern real-
ity.258 The rearrangement of the life configuration over time is part of
the normal passage through existence in our era.2 59 We need not see
things so "darkly." What we must do is develop institutions, programs
and procedures which promote the child's best interests under contem-
porary conditions. Keep in mind that divorce and conflict over custody
does not condemn all involved to life in a depressing Ingmar Bergman
film. Perhaps the orthodox psychoanalytic view inclines its followers to-
ward the Bergmanesque. A theory built on ideas such as the death in-
stinct, the repetition compulsion, sadomasochism etc. certainly might
dispose one to the "tragic sense of life."260 My opinion is that the least
detrimental alternative standard is a manifestation of the impulse to
overreact to perceived crises. The traditional best interests test is more
in keeping with an active, life-affirming approach to the custody issue.
Having completed my explanation and critical evaluation of each
element of the paradigm, I now offer some miscellaneous, but relevant,
thoughts on the work of the BBI group.
In his 1968 essay "Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence"2 61 Professor
Goldstein announced something which should be of great interest to us.
He stated that "[s]ince dispositions are frequently rendered in divorce
proceedings without presenting the decision makers with adequate data
about the child and the available alternative custodians, a presumption
should be established to favor relatively long-standing and continuous
relationships." '262 This pronouncement has escaped the attention of
those who have criticized the work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit. This
statement does much to undercut the authoritative nature of the BBI
paradigm. Keep in mind that the paradigm is essentially the continuity
concept. The general rule is that custody goes to the person who has
spent the most time with the child. Professor Goldstein's words indicate
258. The orthodox psychoanalytic perspective appears to isolate the BBI advo-
cates from the interpersonal process dimensions of modern culture.
259. See, e.g., DANIEL LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE. (Ballentine
paperback 1979).
260. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (W. W. Norton
paperback ed. 1961)(detailing this "tragic sense of life").
261. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19.
262. Id. at 475.
[Vol. 16
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/3
1992]
that the continuity concept is in essence a makeshift. The professor's
statement indicates that what is truly needed in all cases is adequate
data. This author agrees. Further, our discussion of Painter63 makes it
clear that there exists a useful basic model which can guide us in gath-
ering and evaluating the important facts. It is a great mistake to raise a
stopgap formula to the level of decision-making paradigm. This is sim-
ply not the way to promote the psychological best interests of the child.
The way to produce appropriate decisions is to conscientiously apply
ourselves to the acquisition and evaluation of the relevant facts.264
The psychoanalytic infrastructure of the BBI paradigm makes it
clear that the type of psychoanalysis embraced by the BBI group is the
orthodox psychoanalysis long-championed by Anna Freud. As Paul
Roazen, a scholarly commentator on psychoanalysis, wrote in 1975,
"Anna Freud remains today one of the most outspoken defenders of
psychoanalysis. ' 63 It is clear from the context of Roazen's statement
that he was referring to orthodox psychoanalysis. However, it must be
stated that the orthodox theory is simply outdated. The classical theory
is too much of a product of Freud's immersion in the "work-machinery
image of his time. '266 His psychodynamic model was in large measure
determined by the concepts current in the nineteenth century world of
physical science. Freud's language and preferred metaphors plainly re-
veal his affinity for the concepts of mechanics, work and energies.2 67
For example, the "ego" of Freud's psychoanalysis acts as a machine
which converts the energy of the "id," the reservoir of sexuality and
263. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152 at 156.
264. In order to do this most effectively, those of us in legal education must
continue to make law students aware of the models useful in advocating and deciding
such cases, expose them to appropriate fact gathering processes, teach them how to
evaluate the facts, demonstrate how the facts should be presented to the trier and sensi-
tize them to the human dimensions of child custody cases. Over the last decade legal
education has done much to prepare students to operate in the modern custody milieu.
We surely must do more. Moreover, continuing legal education programs have enlight-
ened man) who did not have the benefit of the new curriculum. Many individual social
workers, psychologists, human development specialists, legal scholars and psychiatrists
have done a great deal to educate judges, law professors and practitioners. Creative and
concerned law practitioners have instructed many of us on this matter of deciding best
interests custody cases. All of us must continue to raise the collective level of the law's
best interests awareness. We should not allow ourselves to be enthralled by the skill of
those who have mastered the art of Occam's razor.
265. PAUL ROAZEN, FREUD AND His FOLLOWERS 458 (1975).
266. See EDGAR LEVENSON, THE FALLACY OF UNDERSTANDING 58 (1972).
267. Id. at 59.
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aggression, into a force which can be used in socially acceptable
ways.2 68 Drive, cathexis and libido are all concepts derived from
energics. 269 Repression is a concept derived from hydraulics.27 The or-
thodox psychoanalytic model has very definite bio-mechanical qualities.
It is this model which has so greatly influenced Anna Freud and her
BBI colleagues. Anna Freud, in fact, has discussed the possibility of
refining ego functions so that they become "more and more objective
and independent of the emotions until they become as accurate and
reliable as a mechanical apparatus. 21
Today, other models are available for those who are working in
family law which will prove to be far more useful than the nineteenth
century rooted paradigm of orthodox psychoanalysis which has very
definite bio-mechanical qualities. The following models, briefly dis-
cussed, are firmly rooted in the twentieth century experience of human
beings. Erik Erikson's model' introduced in the context of the analy-
sis of Painter,"' is one which has great potential utility. Erikson's theo-
retical model which is soundly rooted in clinical observation has been
built over the last thirty years. He certainly owes a very real debt to
Freud, but his work is substantially informed by modern anthropology,
history, developmental psychology, ethics/morals, politics, literature,
etc. Erikson's model is far less reductionistic, closed and negativistic
than that of orthodox psychoanalysis. Robert J. Lifton, a psychiatrist,
has certainly drawn on Freud's pioneering work but he too offers a new
paradigm."" ' He has created a new model by mending a revisionist psy-
choanalysis and the lessons of modern history.275 Lloyd DeMause has
also joined history and psychoanalysis to teach about the psychology of
children and adults. 276 Gregory Bateson, an eclectic scholar, has com-
bined communications systems theory, ecology and psychoanalysis to
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. PAUL ROAZEN AND ERIK ERIKSON, THE POWER AND LIMITS OF A VISION
22 (1976). Scrutiny of Anna Freud's work reveals that it, like her father's, is rooted in
nineteenth century concepts of physical science. Her most widely read publication is
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, 2 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD (1967).
272. See ERIKSON, supra note 7.
273. See LASWELL, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
274. See R. LIFTON, THE LIFE OF THE SELF (1976).
275. See R. LIFTON, DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA (1969); R. LIF-
TON, HOME FROM THE WAR (1973); R. LIFTON, THE BROKEN CONNECTION (1979).
276. See DEMAUSE, supra note 138.
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give a new perspective on family life.2 7 Heinz Kohut, 218 a psychoana-
lyst, has authored a new self-psychology which emphasizes interper-
sonal phenomenon and the development of the individual's narcissistic
life line. Finally, Alice Miller, a Swiss psychoanalyst, has created a
revisionist psychoanalytic model focusing on failures in parental empa-
thy and the resulting impact on the child's psychological
development.27 9
In summary, there is much modern work available to us which
incorporates certain psychoanalytic ideas of current utility and brings
us a great deal of the relevant wisdom of our time. Ultimately, we live
in our own historical era. The legal problems of our time are best un-
derstood when we employ models relevant to our condition. The Victo-
rian era is dead. It is simply fact that orthodox psychoanalysis was not
formulated by people who understood the contemporary "culture of di-
vorce." Further, we live in a new, electronic, information, economic,
political and social environment - we are "new" people. We must turn
to the "new" psychology and other up-dated disciplines to aid our quest
for human justice. Thus, the BBI paradigm takes parents, children and
the law out of the context of modern relevancy. There is more to par-
ent-child life in these days than the family-of-privacy. Day care, baby
sitters, single parent life styles, single parent family structure, the un-
wed mother phenomenon, latch-key life, joint (shared) custody, blended
family existence, media impact on children and parents etc. have
worked enormous changes in the way children and their parents live.
We cannot deny the existence of a recently evolved and complex
reality.
Anna Freud's orthodox psychoanalysis is objectionable for another
fundamental reason. The theory is essentially a psychology of social
adjustment.2 80 This theory assumes that the child is primarily a being
of impulse which must be tamed. Ms. Freud, in commenting negatively
on freedom-oriented progressive schools, stated "[i]nstead of forcing
the child to fit into the environment, they aim at fitting a flexible envi-
ronment to the needs of the individual child, so as to give the pupil's
abilities the widest possible scope for expression. 281 She opposes such
277. See G. BATESON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF THE MIND 271-78 (1972).
278. See generally HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS OF SELF (1971); HEINZ
KOHUT, THE RESTORATION OF SELF (1977) for an overview of Kohut's work.
279. See MILLER, supra note 167.
280. See, e.g., 4 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 1945-1956, 75-94 (1968).
281. Id. at 84.
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progressive schooling because "the result is a lack of adjustment to cur-
rent reality."2 82 This preference for social adjustment is made manifest
in the academic and expert witness work of the BBI group.283
Certainly, one must be able to act in an adaptive manner. An indi-
vidual must understand the social context in which he or she lives and
be able to take this context into consideration when making private or
public decisions. That flexibility is desirable. Social reality is always a
process of change. By forcing an "adjustment" from the child we, in
fact, deprive her or him of not only autonomy but the capacity to adapt
to social change.
If a child is to have a full measure of individual best interests op-
portunity, something else is needed. To succeed over the life span the
child must be permitted to become protean enough to adapt to cultural
change. 24 In other words, we should seek to give children the power to
self-actualize. One must "adapt" to his or her personal self and loved
ones as well as to society. To know only the norms current as injunc-
tions and exhortations during one's childhood is not in one's best inter-
ests. There is no overall social advantage in such a situation because it
does not prepare the young to meet the future.
Edgar A. Levenson, in discussing the move to a new psychoana-
lytic paradigm, wrote that "[f]amilies in our present society, although
in rapid flux, are quite differently organized [from the family of pri-
vacy]. They tend to be nonauthoritarian, matriarchal, relatively un-
structured. . ". ."I  The psychoanalytic model which underlies the BBI
paradigm is the product of a social order which no longer exists. Ad-
justment, authoritarian structure, patriarchal control and "traditional"
family life styles are no longer "dominant" phenomena. A new "best
interests test" focused decision-making model built on a contemporary
human science, is required in order to have informed child custody ad-
judication in a culture of change.
V. CODA
This coda is affixed to the criticism of the BBI paradigm in order
to suggest that there is an alternative approach to the resolution of
282. Id.
283. See BBI (1979), supra note 4, at 16 (using the term "social adaptation").
284. See LIFTON, supra note 275 (the body of Lifton's works both describe and
analyze this "protean quality").
285. EDGAR LEVENSON, THE FAILURE OF UNDERSTANDING 113 (1972).
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child custody disputes. Although the construction of a critique has been
my primary endeavor, I believe that an obligation exists to describe, in
short form, a manner in which lawyers, judges and psychological ex-
perts might better approach the matter of the child's psychological best
interests 86
It is emphasized that a true best interests approach must empha-
size the child's psycho-social needs rather than a developmental per-
spective. Any serious best interests analysis must be retrospective, fo-
cused in the present, and at the same time, prospective. The essence of
the best interests paradigm, presented here, derives from the work of
Erik Erikson a non-medical psychoanalyst, field researcher, and devel-
opmental theorist.28 7 I have taken certain necessary terminological lib-
erties with Erikson's model so that his work is more easily understood;
however, the essential integrity of Erikson's vision is preserved. Keep in
mind that the elements of Erikson's model presented at this point serve
to enhance our best interests perspective as it relates to the resolution
of child custody disputes.
For those working in the child custody arena, the first five stages
of Erikson's model are relevant. These five stages cover the child's
psychosocial development from birth through adolescence 288 and will be
discussed in some detail. 89 In order to provide additional data which
sheds light on the best interests decision in Painter, I further elaborate
on the brief outline of the Erikson model.
A. Stage I: The Age of Attachment, Reciprocity, and the For-
mation of Basic Trust during the first year of life
In this first phase of psycho-social development, the child needs
very significant physical and emotional input. The child needs attention
and stimulation. This is a time period during which the child seeks very
close attachment to a custodian who will provide nurturing. Any custo-
286. An earlier version of this alternative paradigm has been discussed in a prior
publication. See John Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological
Approach to Proof and Decision-Making, 12 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 491 (1976).
287. Erikson is a Pulitzer Prize winner and a leading American humanist as well
as a clinician/theoretician. For a most personal and readable perspective on the man
and his work, see R. EVANS, DIALOGUE WITH ERIK EPIKSON (1964).
288. See ERIKSON, supra note 7.
289. For the most accessible detailed account of the five stages, see ERIKSON,
supra note 118.
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dian must be capable of giving a responsive human reaction' " and a
best interests legal analysis must focus on this development reality. It is
requisite for appropriate development that the custodian and child
must form a relatively close personal bond. The child's psychosocial
development requires a relationship based on close reciprocal interac-
tion. In order for the child's best interests to be promoted there must be
a commitment by the custodian to adapt to the child's need for attach-
ment and psychological and physical stimulation. The custodian must
learn to adjust to the child's internal bio-psychological clock. Time-
scheduled mechanical parenting will not meet the child's needs. More-
over, the child's best interests require that any person acting in a custo-
dial capacity must share substantial periods of time with the child con-
cerned. Close human contact with the child is absolutely essential for
appropriate development.
The psychological consequences of appropriate child and custodian
interaction during this period are significant. A positive first phase ex-
perience produces "a sense of basic trust." 91 This "sense of basic
trust" allows a child to feel confidence in those who nurture and in the
child's immediate environment. Over time, this form of trust general-
izes to other persons and other environmental settings. This feeling of
basic trust allows children to bond with and show concern for people
outside of the family. In addition, it promotes communal combinations
and social interaction. A just society based on equality before the law
must draw on a social structure derivative of this "sense of basic trust."
Further, the development of this condition of trust gives rise to a sense
of hope.2 92 This sense of hope gives one faith in a future of possibilities.
All this serves as a defense against the inevitable set-backs, disappoint-
ments and tragedies of real life. Only a custodian who can be deeply
engaged with the child during this stage of development can give the
child what she or he needs. Finally, a best interests custody court dispo-
sition will be one which favors a potential custodian who can meet the
very special needs of the Stage I child.
290. See Erik Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, in I PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES
63 (1959)(for a discussion of this requisite).
291. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 96-97.
292. See ERIKSON, supra note 7, at 79.
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B. Stage II: The Quest for Autonomy during the second and
third years of life
During this stage of development the child is much less dependent
than he or she was in the first phase of development. There is a signifi-
cant increase in motor behavior. There is also a concomitant need to
assert the self.29 The child is actively exploring the world in which he
or she lives. The "I", often in the form of "me", begins to assert itself.
The child is initiating the development of an independent existence. Of
course, the child still needs the custodian, but the relationship is in the
process of changing. The child seeks an age appropriate sense of libera-
tion, a feeling of autonomy. She or he starts to manifest a personal
sense of will.
In this developmental phase the child insists on doing things for
himself/herself. Furthermore, the phase two child can be rebellious and
"no" saying. Negation becomes a way of asserting the burgeoning self.
This kind of self expression can frustrate the custodian, but an appro-
priate custodian is one who is able to accept this situation as a natural
part of the child's psychological development.2 94 Too much "law and
order" will break the child's spirit and undercut his or her authentic
autonomy.2 The proper custodian for the child in this stage of devel-
opment is the person who can accept the fact that the child is no longer
as dependent as he or she was in stage one. The best custodian for the
child, in this time of the child's life, is one who is not disturbed by the
child's movement along the autonomy line. A custodian who institutes
repressive measures during this developmental phase does no act in the
child's best interests. A best interests custodian must be tolerant and
capable of using reasonable restraints in a manner suited to the child's
development.
C. Stage III: The Phase of Expansion between ages of four
and five
At this time, the child ventures away from the family and enters
the greater social realm. Play with children from other homes gives the
child new experiences. Additionally, the child begins to see that grown-
ups work in stores, as police officers, truck drivers, office workers, and
293. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 107.
294. Id. at 109.
295. Id. at 113.
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other jobs. The child's social awareness increases dramatically.
Through play, the child explores some of our culture's available socio-
economic roles. Phase III is one of energetic activity. Aggressively curi-
ous, physically active, and verbally invasive, the child is at times ap-
proaching a "run-away" state. 29 6 However, the custodian must
understand that this is normal from the child's perspective. Again a
best-interests stance dictates that the custodian act in a manner which
provides reasonable protection for and restraint of the child. On the
other hand, there must be a reasonable opportunity for self expression
in deed, thought, and word.
A successful phase three child has learned to exercise initiative.297
However, during this period of development the child also begins to
learn that one's personal initiative must be channeled. Culture requires
the child to become concerned about intention, objective and result.
Our culture expects the child to develop a "sense of purpose. '298 In
addition, the child must learn to relate to social groups made up of
non-family as well as family members. The child must come to learn
that life requires harmonious social interaction with those beyond the
family enclave. Finally, it is well documented that phase three is a time
when sexual identity is beginning to become strongly established. 9' A
gender style is being derived from the child's experience in family and
culture. Given this information, it is certain that this phase of develop-
ment is a lively one.
The best interests custodian under law for the phase three child
will have the following orientation:
1. prefer age-appropriate, independent behavior, not tether the
child to the family
2. be encouraging of and supportive of purposeful activity
3. be able to model and support culture appropriate gender identity
development
4. will not be threatened by the child's movement away from the
custodian and into the world of others
296. Id. at 115.
297. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, 255-58 (2d ed. 1983).
298. See ERIK ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 120-22 (1964).
299. For a well-written explanation of the gender making process, see H.
NUNBERG, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 69-70 (1955).
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D. Stage IV. The Learning Age from approximately the sixth
through the eleventh year
In discussing Painter,300 much information about this phase has
been put forth. Thus, a short description is presented here. In this
phase of psycho-social development the child is transported by culture
into the environment of school.801 The child is now engaged in learning
fundamentals which are relevant to taking a place in the society and
economy of his generation. This is a time of rapid intellectual growth
promoted by adults situated outside of the home. This does not mean
that parents have no role to play. They can play a significant part in
introducing the child to the broader culture and its fund of knowledge
and values. However, at this time, the adult agents of culture operating
in the school environment will play a major role in the child's develop-
ment. The child is now caught up in the task of working to master the
operations and values deemed important by our culture. Mastery and
competency are fundamental matters. Given this psycho-social reality,
the preferred best interests custodian under law is one who can act to
support the child in the educational setting.
E. Stage V. Adolescence and the Struggle for Identity between
age twelve through age eighteen
The crucial task of adolescence is to fashion an individual sense of
self. Erikson uses the term "existential identity."302  Earlier
psychosocial experiences are integrated and the young person is pre-
pared to move into adulthood. Acquiring an authentic "sense of iden-
tity" 303 is no simple matter. The process of identity acquisition is, at
times, quite chaotic. The adolescent changes styles, ideologies, roles
and behavior with great frequency. She is a revisionist-in-action. To the
adult, it may appear that the adolescent is adrift on the sea of exis-
tence. But the adolescent's efforts are purposeful. The process has its
own validity. The adolescent is trying to answer the question: "Who am
I?"
Viewed from an outcome perspective, adolescence holds three pos-
300. See LASWELL, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
301. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 122-28.
302. On the matter of "existential identity" see ERIKSON, supra note 7, at 73.
303. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 128-135; see also ERIK ERIKSON, Toys
AND REASONS 106-110 (1977).
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sible fates. The adolescent can develop an authentic, sustaining self,
flounder in "identity confusion,''804 or accept a "negative identity."305
Of course, the coming into being of an authentic identity is the desired
result. "Identity confusion" means that the person will be
psychosocially impaired and, if things are not corrected, will experience
vitality eroding psychological symptoms throughout his or her lifetime.
If the outcome is a "negative identity" one suffers throughout life as an
outcast, beyond integration into our culture. Delinquency, crime and
severe mental illness may become the lifeline of such a person. The best
interests custodian for a young person on this identity quest is the adult
who can be empathically involved in the journey, but still keep in mind
that, as an adult, one is in a different phase of the life cycle. The com-
petent custodian will not be a person who returns to adolescence. The
best interests custodian must be one who can act out of adult wisdom
to facilitate best interests development. Further, it is important that the
custodian not be authoritarian, negativistic or highly punitive. An effec-
tive custodian will be one who understands that adolescent experimen-
tation is necessary. However, the effective custodian is able to recog-
nize when the young person is in real trouble and intervene, if
necessary. The best interests caretaker is the person who can accept the
protean style of adolescence, avoid promoting negative identity or iden-
tity confusion, provide wise counsel and act to promote a positive
identity.
Thus, the Eriksonian paradigm has very significant potential for
use in the child-custody decision process. The use of the paradigm by
attorneys, psychological experts and judges can do much to produce an
appropriate best interests result. The above discussed paradigm is of
more use to those involved in the child custody arena than that model
put forth by the BBI group.
Used by itself, the Erikson derived paradigm has great utility.
However, certain rather recent developments in modern psychoanalysis
have provided us with important concepts which ought to be affixed to
the Eriksonian paradigm. For example, non-orthodox psychoanalystic
clinicians and theoreticians, Heinz Kohut3 06 and Alice Miller3 07 have
developed empathy-centered approaches to psychotherapy. Both of
304. For a discussion of identity confusion, see ERIKsoN, supra note 153, at 131.
305. For a discussion of the concept of negative identity, see ERIKSON, supra
note 7, at 73.
306. See KOHUT, supra note 278.
307. See MILLER, supra note 167.
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these psychoanalysts focus on so-called object relations and the self.
The technical term "object relations" refers to relationships between
people. Kohut and Miller stress empathic interpersonal attachments
and their relationship to the child's development of a positive sense of
self. Both of these free-thinking psychoanalysts eschew the nineteenth
century vocabulary and models of orthodox psychoanalysis. Alice
Miller's work is especially accessible to those who have little experience
with psychoanalytic or psychological concepts.
Heinz Kohut stresses the importance of the empathic situation.308
The custodian must be psychologically in tune with the child's needs.
In order for successful parenting to occur the adult, through identifica-
tion with the child must be able to "experience" the feelings, thoughts,
wishes, anxieties, etc. of the child. Empathy allows the custodian to
"read" and then respond in line with the "information" received
through the empathic experience. Kohut who is certainly the pioneer of
the "science of empathy", states:
Empathy is, I am convinced not just a poor relation of those other
forms of cognition that we hold in high esteem because we consider
them functions of our prized intellect. Empathic modes of perceiv-
ing ourselves and our surroundings exist from the beginning of our
lives side by side with other, nonempathic, modes of perception. 09
Kohut's clinical work indicates that the lack of an empathic response
from the parent weakens the child's sense of self and undermines psy-
chological stability. 310 Such a result is, of course, not in the psychologi-
cal best interests of the child. On the other hand, an empathic response
called mirroring, which shows the child that in the parent's eyes she or
he is a valuable person, is the key to the development of a stable sense
of self and a basic sense of security. 1
Alice Miller also stresses the need for an empathic relationship
between custodian and child.312 Miller's clinical work has persuaded
her thait empathic nurturing is necessary for successful psychological
development. The empathic custodian is one who can allow the child to
308. See HEINZ KOHUT. THE RESTORATION OF SELF 85 (1977).
309. The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut 1950-1978 678
(P.H. Ornstein ed. 1980).
310. See KOHUT, supra note 308, at 77-79.
311. See HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS OF SELF 105-199 (1971).
312. ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD 62 (1983).
Batt
63
Batt: Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Bes Interests Paradigm:
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
have or express his or her real emotions. " ' The child is free to be
happy, sad, angry as well as other emotions. The empathic parent does
not teach the child to make a social impression. Moreover, the child is
not used to satisfy the needs and the ambitions of the parent. 14 Like
Kohut, Miller concludes that the empathic parent is one who is capable
of giving adequate "mirroring." ' 5 In mirroring, a custodian looks upon
the child with a fundamental sense of approval.3" Mirroring is a mani-
festation of a healthy parental pride directed toward the being of the
child. Miller also holds that the empathic parent gives respect and at-
tention as well as providing mirroring. 317 Such a parent does not humil-
iate, ridicule, deceive or manipulate the child. Miller states that it is
only through a satisfactory relationship with a relatively empathic par-
ent that a child comes to have a true self. The true self allows one to
connect honestly with his or her emotions and with a life which pro-
motes the well-being of the self.
My opinion is that Alice Miller and Heinz Kohut provide us with
clinically based insights important in the making of best interests child
custody determinations. Although Erikson's psycho-social paradigm is
the core of a very useful approach to child custody dispute resolution, I
would contend that Kohut and Miller's findings in regard to empathy
and mirroring can be used to "perfect" the decision-making process.
Miller and Kohut's emphasis on the empathy-mirroring role of the par-
ent serves to complement Erikson's focus on the vital matter of psycho-
social needs. The empathy-mirroring response is most critical in the
earlier years of childhood; however, a best interests custodian must pro-
vide empathy and mirroring at all stages of development. How the par-
ent provides empathy and mirroring should be a function of what the
child requires at particular Eriksonian stages of development. The
needs of adolescents, of course, differ from the needs of children in
earlier stages.
Combining the approaches of Miller, Kohut and Erikson the pro-
posed decision-making perspective can be summarized in the following
way. Custody under the law should be awarded to the person who is
313. See ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILDHOOD 16 (1981).
314. Id. at 34.
315. See ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILDHOOD 16 (1981); see also ALICE
MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEYS 47-68 (1990); HEINZ KOHUT, How DOES ANALYSIS
CURE 143 (1984).
316. See ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILDHOOD 16 (1981).
317. Id. at 14-21.
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comparatively the most capable of providing appropriate empathy/mir-
roring and the most capable of meeting the psycho-social developmen-
tal needs of the child. In a sense what is required is a totality of
psycho-social circumstances best interests analysis. The term
psychosocial is here expanded to encompass the empathy/mirroring re-
lationship between child and custodian. In addition, lawyers, psycholog-
ical experts and judges must keep in mind that any informed custody
decision requires that there be a retrospective analysis of the relevant
material, an "in the present" analysis and a prospective analysis. A
future projection is required. It cannot be avoided. Past and present
data are fundamental in making future-casts. In particular cases, it
might be appropriate to modify the custody decree as the child moves
from one stage to another stage. Realistically speaking, given our cur-
rent orientation, this would seldom be done. But courts should not hesi-
tate to change custody, at any time, if a shift would maximize the best
interests position of the child. It should be emphasized that the above
stated approach involves in part an evaluation of the comparative
"parenting" fitness of the contesting custodians. Comparative fitness is
certainly a general concept familiar to those who focus on the resolu-
tion of child custody disputes.
Finally, it is a fundamental contention of this writer that the BBI
"presumption" with its focus on continuity can only serve to blur our
best interests focus of attention. Reality is far too complex to be evalu-
ated from the continuity position. True best interests decisions require
that we evolve a decision centered paradigm of relevance - one which
allows insight into the complexities of a best interests existence. The
reader is, of course, reminded that a paradigm expresses an ideal and it
must be used with that knowledge in mind. However, the suggested
paradigm is a guide to practice. Our practice work can be benefitted by
its use.
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